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INTRODUCTION

For the uninitiated, a Sherman Act case is an oddity worthy of “Ripley’s
Believe It or Not.” The text of the statute is simple enough—it unqualifiedly
illegalizes “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . .”1 The scope of this simple text,
however, has been perverted beyond recognition by the cadre of highly skilled
lawyers and economists who specialize in antitrust litigation and the courts that
entertain their arguments. From Congress’s ban on “restraint[s] of trade,” the
courts have created per se rules against price-fixing,2 tying,3 horizontal boycotts,4
and market allocation agreements,5 while the less restrictive “rule of reason”6
applies to covenants not to compete,7 group bidding arrangements,8 and collective
advertising restrictions.9 The line between these two rules is far from clear10 or
stable,11 although it ostensibly reflects the fuzzy common law that the Sherman
Act federalized.12
1.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
2.
See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
3.
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
4.
See, e.g., Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Broad.
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984).
5.
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).
6.
Under the rule of reason, the courts opened the door for an exhaustive inquiry into all
circumstances that might conceivably explain the economic effects of the restraint at issue,
including the nature of competition in the relevant market, the share of that market held by each of
the competitors therein, and the parties’ reasons for implementing the restraint. The open-ended
formulation of the rule of reason was first described by the Supreme Court in Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), and has been repeated in several more recent
Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723
(1988) (describing the rule of reason approach); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 49 n.15 (1977) (same).
7.
Cincinnati Packet v. Bay, 200 U.S. 179, 184 (1906); Shawnee Compress Co. v.
Anderson, 209 U.S. 423 (1908).
8.
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
9.
California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
10. See, e.g., id. at 779 (“The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive
effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se’ … and ‘rule of reason’ tend to make them appear.”);
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) (“[T]here is often no
bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis,” since “considerable inquiry into
market conditions” may be required before the application of any so-called “per se” condemnation
is justified.). See also Thomas E. Kauper, Section Two of the Sherman Act: The Search for
Standards, 93 GEO. L.J. 1623, 1627 (2005) (lamenting that “no discernible principle can be found”
in antitrust law in general and section 2 cases in particular).
11. See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationary, 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (applying
the rule of reason to a price-fixing arrangement); FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447
(1986) (same); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(Bork, J.) (same); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying the
rule of reason to a tying claim). See also Part II.D., infra.
12. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.), aff’d,
175 U.S. 211 (1899). Some scholars have praised then-Judge Taft’s Addyston Pipe opinion for
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Shortly after Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890, its interpreters
began tinkering with the statute’s meaning, in violation of every conceivable
canon of statutory interpretation. And therein lies the puzzle: While jurists13 and
theoreticians14 of all political stripes have decried “judicial activism,” which
(broadly conceived) includes the usurpation of lawmaking power by an unelected
judiciary, no one has noticed15—much less decried—the judicial lawmaking that
defines the field of federal antitrust law. Those exercised by judges who would
rewrite relatively minor statutes with relatively minor effects16 nonetheless turn a
blind eye toward—or, in some cases, celebrate17—judges who assume commonlawmaking powers18 over the massive engines of American commerce via the
recognizing that the common law had always adopted a distinction between “naked” and
“ancillary” restraints, condemning the former automatically, but subjecting the latter to further
analysis for reasonableness. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF 26-30 (1978). Regardless of the exact scope of the common law in 1890, it is
indisputable that the Sherman Act purported to codify it. See id. at 61; Donald Dewey, The
Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L. REV. 759, 759 (1955); John C. Peppin,
Price-Fixing Agreements Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 305-51
(1940).
13. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 643 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979-1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); City of Chicago v. Morales 527 U.S. 41, 81 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 100 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents 528 U.S. 62, 98-99 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The kind of judicial activism
manifested in cases like Seminole Tribe, Alden v. Maine [, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)], Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), and College
Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999), represents
such a radical departure from the proper role of this Court that it should be opposed whenever the
opportunity arises.”).
14. The Court’s federalism decisions have provided ample fodder for scholarly accusations
of “judicial activism” from across the ideological spectrum. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Are the
Judicial Safeguards of Federalism the Ultimate Form of Conservative Judicial Activism?, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1363 (2002); JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT
VS. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 4 (2003) (“I]n fits of judicial activism evocative of the infamous
Lochner era, the Court’s majority reaches out to strike down progressive rights-expanding
legislation at both the federal and state levels. Its justifications vary but the Court often invokes
the vacillating and inscrutable requirements of ‘federalism,’ a word that appears nowhere in the
Constitution but that has often proved handy for negating federal protection of the rights of the
people.”).
15. For a notable exception, which proves the general rule of popular obliviousness, see
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass. 1953) (Wyzanski, J.)
(in “the anti-trust field the courts have been accorded, by common consent, an authority they have
in no other branch of enacted law,” an authority so broad that “the only comparable examples” are
“the economic role they formerly exercised under the fourteenth amendment, and the role they
now exercise in the area of civil liberties”), aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See also infra
note 28.
16. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 590-95 (1998) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 12, at 72 (delighting in the fact that “[t]he process of
antitrust lawmaking has largely been confided to the judiciary”).
18. The Court has also asserted common-law powers through the National Labor Relations
Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51
(1957), the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 34 Stat. 232 (1908) (FELA), see Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 145 (2003), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
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antitrust laws.19
For almost seventy years,20 there has been no doubt that federal courts
lack the constitutional power to promulgate substantive rules of decision in
common-law cases (such as contract- or tort-based suits between private parties
for money damages).21 However, when it comes to antitrust law, everyone
appears to be in equally broad agreement to the contrary.22 The conventional
wisdom appears to be that while federal courts lack the constitutional power to
alter the common-law meanings of a “contract” and its “breach,”23 they
nonetheless possess the power to define—and redefine—the terms of a
“[reasonable] contract”24 under the Sherman Act.
Although rarely enunciated, the conventional wisdom’s justification
comes in one of two somewhat contradictory flavors. First, some defenders of the
status quo assume that because Sherman Act cases are justiciable under federal
question jurisdiction,25 they are immune from Erie’s bar on federal common
lawmaking in diversity suits.26 Second, other apologists assume that the antitrust

Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (ERISA), see Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56
(1987), and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), superseded by 33
U.S.C. § 1251 (2000), see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). Nevertheless, this
Article focuses exclusively on the Sherman Act.
19. In Finley, the Court upheld a provision of the National Foundation on the Arts and the
Humanities Act of 1965. See 524 U.S. at 572-73. At stake was less than $100 million in 1998
dollars (from GAO). By sharp contrast, America’s gross domestic product—a measure of the
goods and services produced and consumed by our nation’s businesses—was $8.747 trillion in
1998 (from BEA). Far from fretting about judges’ antitrust powers, even staunch conservatives
celebrate it. See supra note 17.
20. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
21. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279
(1989) (“Although petitioners and their amici would like us to craft some common-law standard of
excessiveness that relies on notions of proportionality between punitive and compensatory
damages, or makes reference to statutory penalties for similar conduct, these are matters of state,
not federal, common law.”); but see Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
22. See California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (describing the “quasicommon-law realm of antitrust”); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978) (“Congress . . . did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full meaning of
the statute or its applications in concrete situations. The legislative history makes it perfectly clear
that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law
tradition.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) (“The
statute books are full of laws, of which the Sherman Act is a good example, that effectively
authorize courts to create new lines of law.”); William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers,
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661,
663 (1982) (“Congress adopted what is in essence enabling legislation that has permitted a
common-law refinement of antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the most general
statutory directions.”).
23. See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 28-33 (1977).
24. As explained further below, the courts judicially amended section 1 of the Sherman Act
to include the word “reasonable.” See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text. The resultant
“rule of reason” has been a defining characteristic of modern antitrust law. See infra notes 94-118
and accompanying text.
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
26. See Part IV.B., infra.
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statutes are not statutes at all,27 and they are therefore exempt from the ordinary
strictures of statutory interpretation.28
I disagree on both counts. This Article argues that the common-law29
monstrosity that federal courts have created atop the Sherman Act’s unadorned
text30 is unconstitutional for two related reasons, both of which are rooted in the
separation of powers. First, it violates the “horizontal” separation of powers by
shifting lawmaking power from Congress to the federal courts. Second, it violates
the “vertical” separation of powers by authorizing federal judges to preempt state
law without a constitutional basis for doing so.31
Before delving into both theses, the next Part describes our “living”
Sherman Act and traces the evolutionary path from its common-law roots to its
modern-day meaning. As Part II illustrates, federal courts have unjustifiably
“interpreted” (read: “rewritten”) the Sherman Act to codify the common-law
principle that judges may make substantive antitrust rules. Part III then argues that
even if the statute means what federal courts say it does—that is, even if the
Sherman Act delegates common-lawmaking powers to federal judges—it is an
27. According to Eskridge and Ferejohn, the Sherman Act is a “super-statute.” See William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1234 (2001) (“The
interpretative history of the Sherman Act provides a classic illustration of the gravitational force a
super-statute exercises on the law . . . . To begin with, a super-statute will generally be applied in a
purposive rather than simple text-bounded or originalist way. It will generate a dynamic common
law implementing its great principle and adapting the statute to meet the challenges posed to that
principle by a complex society. . . . Although the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have emphasized
plain meanings and common law backgrounds in statutory cases more than their predecessors,
they have nonetheless construed the Sherman Act in the purposive, evolutive way the New Deal
and Warren Courts did.”).
28. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in This Class?” The
Conflict between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 620 (2005)
(“Antitrust cases generally discuss precedent and economic policy. They rarely include more than
a passing citation to the statutory text.”). Farber and McDonnell themselves are notable
exceptions. See id. at 631-57 (applying standard tools of statutory interpretation to the antitrust
laws); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813-18 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (same).
29. It bears emphasizing that this Article takes no beef with the administrative dimensions
of antitrust law. See Baxter, supra note 22, at 673-82 (describing the role of the Executive Branch
in antitrust law enforcement). The sole focus here is the common-law dimension of antitrust law—
viz., the judicial formulation of substantive rules to govern contract-based controversies between
private parties for money damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (providing a private right of action to
“[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws”).
30. The Court’s antitrust doctrines have been likened to its atextual “substantive” Due
Process jurisprudence. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24
(2003) (describing antitrust as “Lochnerian”); Edward S. Corwin, The Anti-Trust Acts and the
Constitution, 18 VA. L. REV. 355, 369 (1931-32) (decrying antitrust doctrine as “judicial
legislation”).
31. It bears emphasizing that the Sherman Act’s deleterious effects on the vertical
separation of powers are problematic only to the extent the Act also violates the horizontal
separation of powers. That is, if it were true that the statute raised no horizontal concerns, it would
be no different from a valid delegation of preemptive power to federal judges (such as the Fourth
Amendment). The vertical-separation-of-powers problem arises from the fact that the Sherman
Act is a statute and not a part of the Constitution. See infra notes 172-227 and accompanying text.
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unconstitutional violation of the “horizontal” and “vertical” separation of powers.
Part IV rebuts a common justification for the federal antitrust regime by arguing
that even if Congress has broad discretion to delegate its powers to administrative
agencies, the Constitution places greater restrictions on the delegation of
lawmaking power to the federal courts. That is, even if the all-but-defunct
“nondelegation doctrine”32 blurs the line between Congress and the President, the
line between Congress and the courts must be brighter. Part V concludes.
II.

THE SCOPE OF THE SHERMAN ACT

To understand Sherman’s march into the sea of unconstitutionality,33 one
must first understand from whence he began. Accordingly, this Part describes the
common-law origins of the Act and traces the trajectory of the Court’s antitrust
jurisprudence from 1890 until today. In doing so, it emphasizes the rise of the
“Chicago School” of antitrust and argues that a law-and-economics approach to
the Sherman Act is fundamentally inconsistent with the concurrent rise of the
“textualist” school of statutory interpretation.
This Part concludes that the modern-day scope of the Sherman Act is
illegitimate. Instead of remaining faithful to the content of the common law on
restraints of trade (which the Act arguably codified), the courts have interpreted
the Act to codify the principle of the common law (i.e., the notion that judges can
and should create substantive rules without legislative guidance). The problem is
that the Act says nothing at all about the common law, much less does it deputize
the federal courts with common-lawmaking powers. The judicial implication of
those powers is responsible for unmooring the Sherman Act from its statutory
foundations and setting it adrift in a squally sea of illegitimacy.
A.

Common Law

Prior to the passage of the Sherman Act, competition between business
firms was governed by state common law.34 However, in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, a wave of industrial mergers swept across the nation. In
response to this “Great Merger Movement,”35 federal policymakers were equal
parts confused and panicked:
At the time, many observers believed that the mergers
were a natural consequence of the ongoing industrial
32. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001).
33. “Sherman’s March to the Sea” is the term commonly used to refer to Union General
William Sherman’s rapacious ride through Georgia in early winter of 1864. The March began
when General Sherman’s troops left the captured city of Atlanta, Georgia, on November 15, 1864,
and it ended with the capture and destruction of the port of Savannah on December 22 of that year.
See DAVID J. EICHER, THE LONGEST NIGHT: A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 760-84
(2001).
34. See, e.g., WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 18-46 (1965). The historical background of the Sherman Act is
canvassed in detail in the leading treatise on the topic. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶¶ 101-104 (2d ed. 2004).
35. The term was popularized by Naomi Lamoreaux. See NAOMI LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT
MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1985).
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developments. Many also believed that the mergers were
themselves shaping the direction and pace of industrial
developments and feared the social and political
consequences. But there was widespread confusion and
disagreement at the time, both about the causes of the
Great Merger Movement and about the appropriate ways
for government to respond.36

The legislative byproduct of Congress’s confused panic was the Sherman Act,37
which imposes a blanket ban on “[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . .”38
The American oracle of the common law, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,39
provided one of the earliest40 and best interpretations of the scope of the Sherman
Act.41 In Northern Securities, Justice Holmes explained that, at common law,
contracts or combinations “in restraint of trade” had nothing to do with
“competition” (at least as classical and neoclassical economists define the latter
term42). The common law defined “contracts in restraint of trade” as “contracts
36. Donald J. Smythe, The Supreme Court and the Trusts: Antitrust and the Foundations of
Modern American Business Regulation from Knight to Swift, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 87
(2005).
37. As with all statutes, the “legislative intent” underlying the Sherman Act is unclear.
Compare BORK, supra note 12, at 66 (arguing the Sherman Act’s legislative history suggests its
sole purpose was the promotion of consumer welfare), with Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as
the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Economic Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) (criticizing Bork), and Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust
Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket SecondBest Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 905 n.150 (2000) (same). See also infra notes 169, 200.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
39. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881; 1984).
40. The Court’s first opportunity to review the Sherman Act came in 1895, when the Court
upheld the Act as a valid exercise of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause. See United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). The Court did not have an opportunity to consider
the scope of the Act until two decisions in 1897 and 1898, both of which centered on a debate over
the statute’s common law origins. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166
U.S. 290 (1897), Justice Peckham, writing for a five-to-four majority, held that the Sherman Act
prohibited every restraint of trade. Id. at 312, 328. Under Justice Peckham’s interpretation of the
common law, a coalition of eighteen railroads could not jointly fix their rates and other terms of
service, even if that agreement was “reasonable.” Id. at 328-32. Justice White, relying on his own
reading of the common law, dissented and argued that only “unreasonable” restraints should be
unlawful. Id. at 351-52, 355 (White, J., dissenting). The following year, in United States v. JointTraffic Association, 171 U.S. 505 (1898), the Court examined another railroad price-fixing
agreement, and Justice Peckham again wrote for a five-to-four majority. In Joint-Traffic, however,
Justice Peckham refined his earlier views, holding that while “every” restraint of trade was
unlawful, restraint of trade under the Sherman Act was not coextensive with restraint of trade
under common law. Id. at 568. Justice White again dissented, but this time he did not file an
opinion.
41. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 403 (1904) (“Northern Securities”)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). As one of the co-authors of the leading antitrust treatise has argued,
“Holmes assumed that the framers of the Sherman Act intended neither more nor less than to enact
and, thus, federalize the common law.” Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical
Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019, 1032 (1989) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Classical
Theory].
42. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386-405 (1937);
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with a stranger to the contractor’s business . . . which wholly or partially restrict
the freedom of the contractor in carrying on that business as otherwise he would,”
and the trade restrained “was the contractor’s own.”43 “Combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade,” Holmes continued, “were combinations to keep
strangers to the agreement out of the business.” The objection to them was not “to
their effect upon the parties making the contract,” but rather “to their intended
effect upon strangers to the firm and their supposed consequent effect upon the
public at large.” As such, they “were regarded as contrary to public policy
because they monopolized, or attempted to monopolize some portion of the trade
or commerce of the realm.”44 Labor boycotts often were cited by the courts as
examples of combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade.45
Holmes argued that the Sherman Act’s words “in the form of trust or
otherwise,” referred not to price-fixing agreements, but rather to “exclusionary
practices” directed by the large combination against its competitors. Congress’
concern was not the union of former competitors, but the sinister power exercised
or supposed to be exercised by the combination in keeping rivals out of the
business and ruining those who already were in. It was the ferocious extreme of
competition with others, not the cessation of competition among the partners, that
was the evil feared.46 For Holmes, then, the mere voluntary elimination of
competition among firms by mutual agreement was not covered by the common
law on restraints of trade: “It is lawful to abolish competition by any form of
union,”47 provided that the union was indeed voluntary.
Regardless of the other merits or demerits of his position in Northern
Securities, Holmes was certainly correct about this much: The common law on
restraints of trade cared little (if at all) about “competition.”48 The real focus of
the common law was state sovereignty: Each “State regulates its internal affairs,
supports those who become public charges, and is interested in the industries of
its citizens.”49 Thus, at common law, a “restraint” was subject to stricter scrutiny
if it applied to all of England50 (or all of an American State),51 as opposed to those
RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1990); MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A
THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS (1991).
Cf. HAROLD DEMSETZ, THE EMERGING THEORY OF THE FIRM (1992); JAMES G. MARCH &
RICHARD MICHAEL CYERT, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1992).
43. Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 404 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
45. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 919, 922-26 (1988).
46. Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 404 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 406 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
48. See FREDERICK H. COOKE, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS, MONOPOLIES AND LABOR
UNIONS 310 (1898; 2d ed. 1909); see also 2 ARTHUR J. EDDY, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS 673-74
(1901); WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 96 (1965); HANS J.
THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 181-84 (1954); William Letwin, The English
Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 355 (1954); Donald J. Dewey, The
Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L. REV. 759 (1955); Robert Bork,
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 36-38 (1966);
Hovenkamp, Classical Theory, supra note 41, at 1032-35.
49. Union Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, 61 N.E. 1038, 1040 (Ill. 1901).
50. See, e.g., Prugnell v. Gosse, 82 Eng. Rep. 919 (K.B. 1648).
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that applied only to smaller areas; the distinction had nothing to do with market
realities and everything to do with state sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction.
This conceptual disconnect between “competition” and “restraints of trade”
prompted early arguments that courts should abandon the economically
“inefficient” common law.52
B.

Early Cases

While Justice Holmes played the proverbial Dutch boy with his finger in
the dike,53 the lower courts were busy expanding antitrust beyond its common-law
roots.54 Some—such as the influential courts in New York—stood at the vanguard
in expanding antitrust to embrace classical theories of economics.55 Others—such
as the more conservative courts in Ohio—followed Holmes and refused to
condemn cartels or mergers unless the defendants also had made contracts in
restraint of trade at common law.56 Alas, however, even the Ohioans soon strayed:
In 1898, the state’s favorite son, then-Judge William Howard Taft, issued an
opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,57 which
fuse[d] the neoclassical model of competition with the
51. See Skrainka v. Sharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 526, 527 (1880); Dunlop v. Gregory, 10
N.Y. 241, 244 (1851); Lawrence & King v. Kidder & Sweet, 20 Barb. 641, 647-51 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1851); Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 520, 531 (1853).
52. See Albert M. Kales, Contracts to Refrain From Doing Business or From Entering or
Carrying on an Occupation, 31 HARV. L. REV. 193, 202 (1917) (criticizing the common law on
restraints of trade and arguing antitrust policy should be focused on market economics).
53. See MARY MAPES DODGE, HANS BRINKER, OR THE SILVER SKATES 110-12 (1865;
2003). The first crack in the Sherman Act’s wall came in 1898 when the Court began expanding
the statute beyond its common law origins. See supra note 40.
54. See Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1, 81
(1999) (“[M]any of these [early antitrust] decisions reached results different from those counseled
by traditional articulations of the classical paradigm, and, for that matter, the common law.”). At
least one scholar has condemned these early Sherman Act cases as “Lochnerian.” See Bernstein,
supra note 30, at 24.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 76 F. 895 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896), aff’d
mem., 89 F. 1020 (2d Cir. 1897), rev’d, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); see also People v. Sheldon, 34 N.E.
785 (N.Y. 1893) (holding voluntary price-fixing agreement among coal dealers was not merely
unenforceable in an action brought by one of the parties, but was an indictable criminal
conspiracy); De Witt Wire-Cloth v. New Jersey Wire-Cloth Co., 14 N.Y.S. 277, 278 (Com. Pl.
N.Y. 1891) (concluding “[t]he people have a right to the necessaries and conveniences of life at a
price determined by the relation of supply and demand, and the law forbids any agreement or
combination whereby that price is removed beyond the salutary influence of legitimate
competition”). Other lower federal courts agreed with the New York courts’ expansive
interpretations of the Act. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 58 F. 58 (8th
Cir. 1893), rev’d, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Nelson, 52 F. 646 (D. Minn. 1892); see
also James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional
and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 300-09 (1989) (describing judges’ use of
prevailing economic and political theories in their early interpretations of the Sherman Act).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Greenhut (In re Corning), 51 F. 205, 211 (N.D. Ohio 1892)
(noting defendants acquired their position “without any attempt at any time, by contract, to control
the production of the other distilleries, or the prices at which they should sell, or without any
contract with such distillers in any way restraining trade. The indictment, therefore, in my
judgment, wholly fails to charge a crime . . . .”); In re Greene, 52 F. 104 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892).
57. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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legal doctrine of combinations in restraint of trade. In the
process Judge Taft created the illusion that the law of
combinations in restraint of trade had always been
concerned with ‘competition,’ neoclassically defined.
The result was a thoroughly neoclassical Sherman Act.58

Addyston Pipe, which has been praised for its appreciation of modern economic
realities that are not always coterminous with the stodgy common law,59
suggested that the former must trump over the latter when they conflict. Antitrust
has not been the same since.
In Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta—decided two short years after
Northern Securities—the common law lost its last Dutch defender. Speaking for
the Court, Justice Holmes held that the Sherman Act did more than merely
federalize the common law.60 The statute also changed the status of contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade from merely unenforceable to
affirmatively illegal, and it afforded a private right of action to all parties who
were forced to pay higher prices as a result of defendants’ anticompetitive
behavior.61 Holmes based his conclusion entirely on the text of the Sherman Act
because the common law did not permit damages actions by purchasers from
cartels.62 But the damage was done; everyone—including Justice Holmes—now
recognized that the antitrust statutes’ humble origins in the common law were
simply a jumping-off point for court-ordered policymaking.63 The only question
was the shape the courts’ policy choices would take.
At first, the Court embraced a standardless, ad hoc, everything-and-thekitchen-sink standard for analyzing “restraints of trade.” In its Standard Oil
58. Hovenkamp, Classical Theory, supra note 41, at 1044.
59. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 12, at 26-30.
60. 203 U.S. 390, 391 (1906).
61. Id. (noting § 7 empowers anyone to sue for damages in federal court if they have “been
compelled to pay more for the goods it purchased by reason of the fact that the seller was a party
to an illegal combination”).
62. See, e.g., Seeligson v. Taylor Compress Co., 56 Tex. 219, 227 (1882); Ladd v. S.
Cotton Press & Mfg. Co., 53 Tex. 172, 190 (1880). Justice Holmes additionally noted that one
purpose of the combination was to prevent other pipe producers from selling to the plaintiff. These
competitors clearly would have a cause of action under common-law principles. In addition,
however, § 7 of the Sherman Act gave an action to any person “injured in his business or
property,” and consumers who paid a monopoly overcharge to a cartel clearly were injured.
Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 405 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
63. It is somewhat shocking how far the Court in general and Justice Holmes in particular
moved in the decade following Northern Securities. Notwithstanding the fact that federal courts
do not have the power to create common law crimes, see United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch.) 32 (1812), the Court (in an opinion by Justice Holmes) rejected a constitutional
challenge to the common law powers of federal courts to impose criminal penalties for antitrust
violations. See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (concluding the Sherman Act is
not unconstitutionally void for vagueness because “apart from the common law as to the restraint
of trade thus taken up by the statute, the law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends on his
estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. If his
judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment, as here; he may incur
the penalty of death. ‘An act causing death may be murder, manslaughter, or misadventure,
according to the degree of danger attending it’ by common experience in the circumstances known
to the actor.”).
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decision,64 the Court (per Chief Justice White) held that the statutory ban on
“restraints of trade” should be read only to bar “undue restraints.”65 The good
news was that Chief Justice White attempted to remain faithful to accepted
principles of statutory construction and the common-law meaning of the Sherman
Act’s terms.66 The bad news, however, was that Chief Justice White provided no
guidance on what makes a restraint “undue.”67
The news went from bad to worse when the Court drained Standard Oil’s
holding of any meaning it might have had. In Chicago Board of Trade,68 the
Court (per Justice Brandeis) promulgated the so-called “rule of reason”:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of
trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very
essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied;
its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts. This is not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but
because knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and to predict consequences.69

As others have argued, “Brandeis’s formulation reads smoothly at first glance,
[but] it cannot withstand close analysis. Its words, like White’s in Standard Oil,
are empty.”70 In the wake of Chicago Board of Trade, the great project of antitrust
64. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
65. Id. at 52, 59-60.
66. Id. at 49-51, 59-68 (statutory construction), 51-59 (discussing the common law). See
also BORK, supra note 12, at 35-36 (praising the Standard Oil Court for being Congress’s faithful
agent).
67. See Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional
Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 299 (1986) [hereinafter Arthur, Sea of Doubt] (in Standard
Oil, White embraced “an ad hoc, fact-bound evaluation of the purpose behind each challenged
restraint and its probable or actual effects”).
68. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
69. Id. at 238.
70. Arthur, Sea of Doubt, supra note 67, at 303. See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW 252 (2d ed. 1999) (“Brandeis’ statement of the rule of reason . . . has been one of
the most damaging in antitrust” because it “has suggested to many courts that . . . nearly
everything is relevant”); Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Role
for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 346-47 (2000) (arguing Justice Brandeis’s
formulation of the rule of reason provides no practical guidance on separating lawful from
unlawful “restraints”); Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price
Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1978) (same); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of
Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
14-15 (1977) (same).
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law became the search for a guiding principle—a unified theory that could give
content to Brandeis’s otherwise vacuous standard. In short order, a cadre of elite
economists recognized the demand for their ideas, and they began supplying
competing formulations for “efficient” policy prescriptions.71
C.

Chicago School

Antitrust economists at the turn of the Twentieth Century were progressive
classicists72: They rejected sanguine assumptions about the efficacy of
competition as a check upon concentration, and they exhibited unmitigated
antipathy toward monopoly.73 By the 1950s, antitrust orthodoxy began to coalesce
around the scholarship of Harvard economist Joe S. Bain, who based his relatively
prointerventionist theories on three important economic premises, which
collectively came to connote the “Harvard School” of antitrust. The first was that
economies of scale were not substantial in most markets and dictated truly
anticompetitive concentration levels in only a small number of industries.74 As a
result, many industries contained larger firms and were more concentrated than
necessary to achieve optimal productive efficiency.75 The second was that barriers
to entry by new firms were very large and could easily be manipulated by
dominant firms.76 The third was that the noncompetitive performance (pricing
above marginal cost) associated with oligopoly began to occur at relatively low
concentration levels. According to the Harvard Schoolers, the purpose of antitrust
law should be to remedy “kinked demand curves,” “cutthroat competition,”
“monopoly leveraging,” and other “market failures.”77 The Warren Court
generally embraced Bain’s economic lessons,78 and as a result, antitrust decisions
71. See generally Posner, supra note 70, at 1-20 (describing economists’ competing efforts
to give content to the rule of reason).
72. The then-progressive American Economic Association was founded in 1885.
Influenced by German economic thought, its leaders criticized the laissez-faire assumptions and
policy preferences of conventional economic theory, advocating instead an activist state
responsive to the social ills of industrial society. Important members included Richard Ely, John
Bates Clark, and Simon Patten. See THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE 168-89 (1977).
73. See Baxter, supra note 22, at 666; Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and
the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 136-40 (1984).
74. See, e.g., Joe S. Bain, Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of Entry in
Twenty Manufacturing Industries, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 15, 38 (1954).
75. See JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND
CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 53-113 (1956); Joe S. Bain, Relation of Profit
Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufacturing, 1936-40, 65 Q. J. ECON. 293 (1951);
see also George J. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, AM. ECON. REV., May 1950, at 23
76. See BAIN, supra note 75, at 1-42. Bain identified product differentiation as one of the
most common ways that incumbent firms could manipulate the market to make entry more
difficult. Id. at 114-43.
77. See, e.g., Donald Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws,
72 HARV. L. REV. 50 (1958); CARL KAYSEN & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1959); see
also Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact
of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1542-47 (1984) (describing Harvard School theories of
antitrust law).
78. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 218-19
(1985).
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between 1950-1970 reflected an aggressive role for the courts in policing the
structure and behavior of American industry.79
The so-called “Chicago School”—which emerged as the principal critic of
the Warren Court’s antitrust doctrines80—emphasized laissez-faire economics and
the concept of economic efficiency in support of its policy views.81 According to
the Chicago Schoolers, the purpose of antitrust law should be the maximization of
aggregate consumer welfare, defined as optimal satisfaction of consumer
preferences.82 Courts should not apply the law’s proscriptions unless the
challenged conduct harms consumer welfare thus defined.83 Where concentrated
production yields efficiencies that on balance exceed welfare loss caused by
absence of competition, courts should not intervene.84
Notwithstanding some inconclusive early battles,85 there can be no doubt
79. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); United States v.
Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
80. See William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust:
Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1228-43
(1989).
81. The “Chicago School” is generally traced to Aaron Director and his students. See Aaron
Director & Edward Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U.L. REV. 281 (1956);
Robert Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic
Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157 (1954); Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the
Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The
Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers
Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976);
Page, supra note 80, at 1229-30 n.44; Sam Peltzman, Aaron Director’s Influence on Antitrust
Policy, 48 J.L. & ECON. 313 (2005). For an anthology, see THE COMPETITIVE ECONOMY:
SELECTED READINGS (Y. Brozen ed. 1974).
82. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925, 925-28 (1979); BORK, supra note 12, at 90-160; Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an
Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968); Oliver E. Williamson,
Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977); Baxter, supra note
22, at 693 (“the only legitimate objective that can be distilled from the fundamental congressional
goals of antitrust law is the enhancement of consumer welfare through increased market and firm
efficiency”).
83. See Hovenkamp, supra note 78, at 226-29 (describing the Chicago School’s
neoclassical policy proscriptions).
84. Conceding the impossibility of qualifying welfare gain and loss in any actual case, Bork
states that a “[p]assably accurate measurement of the actual situation is not even a theoretical
possibility. . . .” BORK, supra note 12, at 125; see also Alvin A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande,
Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1660-96 (1983)
(arguing the trade-off calculation is an “impractical,” “nightmarish task” of “enormous cost and
hopeless complexity”). Instead, Bork argues that many practices that were condemned by antitrust
law in the 1970s posed no potential for output restriction and therefore presented no trade-off
question. BORK, supra note 12, at 128. The trade-off question arises primarily in the horizontal
merger situation, for which Bork proposes a market share analysis. See id. at 217-24.
85. Over the lifetime of the Sherman Act, many courts have questioned whether the
Sherman Act’s paramount purpose was the maximization of consumer welfare. See, e.g., United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 322-23 (1896) (Peckham, J.) (“In business
or trading combinations they may even temporarily, or perhaps permanently, reduce the price of
the article traded in or manufactured, by reducing the expense inseparable from the running of
many different companies for the same purpose. Trade or commerce under those circumstances
may nevertheless be badly and unfortunately restrained by driving out of business the small
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who won the war for antitrust’s soul: By the 1980s, Chicago was king.86 Chicago
Schoolers justifiably celebrated as the pages of the U.S. Reports and American
law reviews became increasingly indistinguishable from those of an
econometrician’s manual.87 To be sure, from a policy perspective, the shape of
antitrust doctrine profited mightily.88 But economics’ triumph brought with it an
dealers and worthy men whose lives have been spent therein, and who might be unable to readjust
themselves to their altered surroundings. Mere reduction in the price of the commodity dealt in
might be dearly paid for by the ruin of such a class and the absorption of control over one
commodity by an all-powerful combination of capital.”); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.) (“We have been speaking only of the economic
reasons which forbid monopoly; but, as we have already implied, there are others, based upon the
belief that great industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic
results. In the debates in Congress Senator Sherman himself . . . showed that among the purposes
of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great aggregations of capital because of the
helplessness of the individual before them. . . . Throughout the history of these statutes it has been
constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and
in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete
with each other.”); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (Warren, C.J.)
(“[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the protection of
viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and
prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these
competing considerations in favor of decentralization.”); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270, 274 (1966) (Black, J.) (“From this country’s beginning there has been an abiding and
widespread fear of the evils which flow from monopoly—that is the concentration of economic
power in the hands of a few. On the basis of this fear, Congress in 1890, when many of the
Nation’s industries were already concentrated into what it deemed too few hands, passed the
Sherman Act in an attempt to prevent further concentration and to preserve competition among a
large number of sellers.”).
86. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and The Limits of
Expertise in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 631-42 (2005); Andrew I. Gavil, A First
Look at the Powell Papers: Sylvania and the Process of Change in the Supreme Court,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2002, at 8, 9-11; Baxter, supra note 22, at 692-702. Some scholars date the
tipping point to 1977, when the Supreme Court overturned the per se rule against vertical, nonprice restraints established ten years earlier. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977), overruling, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See also
infra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
87. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 57 (1984) (celebrating the fact that the latest Supreme Court opinions “read like short
treatises on microeconomic analysis”); see also John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic
Authority and the Limits of Expertise in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 631-50 (2005)
(chronicling the effects of economics in general and econometrics in particular in antitrust
litigation); see also Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1048, 1087-90 (1985); Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Peter O. Steiner, Quantitative Methods in Antitrust
Litigation, 46 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 88-104 (1983).
88. For example, in Brown Shoe, the government (and the Supreme Court) condemned a
merger between two shoe companies that commanded a mere 8 percent share in their 29
overlapping markets. See 370 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As
an economic proposition, it is absurd to attribute market power to either firm or to scuttle their
merger on the basis of anticompetitive fears. See John L. Peterman, The Brown Shoe Case, 18 J.L.
& ECON. 81-146 (1975). By contrast, the government condemned the merger between Staples and
Office Depot, see FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997), but the rationale for
doing so—from an economic perspective—was infinitely more rigorous (and defensible). See
Andrew S. Oldham, The MedSouth Joint (Ad)venture: The Antitrust Implications of Virtual Health
Care Networks, 14 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 125, 127 (2005); Robert H. Lande, Resurrecting
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unanticipated and unwelcome friend—namely, judge-made instability. As the
following section illustrates, the Court’s antitrust lawmaking-cum-jurisprudence
has flip-flopped drastically over time, and those changes are hard (if not
impossible) to square with the strong form of stare decisis that interpretations of
statutes generally command.
D.

Instability

The federal courts have blazed a zigzagging path of jurisprudential
destruction from the Sherman Act’s common-law roots through the statute’s early
cases and to the modern Chicago School. Generally, the doctrine of stare decisis
applies with especially strong force to the Court’s interpretation of statutes.89 The
rationale is simple: The Court’s erroneous interpretation of a statute can be
overturned with a mere amendment to the United States Code, which is
significantly less onerous than amending the Constitution.90 Given the importance
of stability to the rule of law,91 the federal courts are therefore generally
unwilling92 to revisit their interpretation of a statute unless and until Congress
amends it.
Alas, as in so many other areas, the Sherman Act plays by its own rules.
The federal courts have repeatedly tweaked the Sherman Act, despite Congress’s
silence.93 For example, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,94 Chief Justice White
held that a company had violated the Sherman Act because it had engaged in a
variety of predatory practices against competitors.95 By 1945, however, in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America,96 Judge Hand held that Alcoa had violated
section 2 of the Sherman Act, even though it was not accused of predatory

Incipiency: From Von’s Grocery to Consumer Choice, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 875, 889-90 (2001).
89. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 493 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing
the Court’s “almost categorical rule of stare decisis in statutory cases”); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-173 (1989) (stare decisis has “special force” in statutory
interpretation).
90. Cf. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 403 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Court’s decision to afford stare decisis effect to its prior interpretation of the immigration laws
because its prior decision was “a statutory case in name only”).
91. See, e.g., Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 100 n.3 (1990) (White, J.,
concurring) (“Stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law, because, among other
things, it promotes stability and protects expectations. Although always an important guiding
principle, it has special force in cases such as this one that involve statutory interpretation because
Congress is in a position to overrule our decision if it so chooses.” (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)); John C. Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes,
71 VA. L. REV. 189, 212 (1985) (“The rule of law signifies the constraint of arbitrariness in the
exercise of government power. . . . [I]t means that the agencies of official coercion should, to the
extent feasible, be guided by rules—that is, by openly acknowledged, relatively stable, and
generally applicable statements of proscribed conduct.” (emphasis added)).
92. There are exceptions. See infra note 374.
93. Since 1890, Congress has amended the Sherman Act six times, but none of those
amendments affected the substance of judge-made antitrust law. See infra note 297 (explaining
legislative amendments to the Act).
94. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
95. Id. at 75-76.
96. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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conduct.97 Thirty years later, the tide once again had shifted, and the law required
a showing of anticompetitive conduct as a prerequisite to a successful
monopolization claim.98
The Court’s “predatory pricing” decisions exhibit similar shakiness.99
Under the old, much-maligned Utah Pie doctrine,100 the Court held that a
defendant may be liable for predatory pricing if the plaintiff can show (i) the
defendant subjectively intended to “wag[e] competitive warfare,”101 and (ii)
market prices fell.102 Under Utah Pie, it was irrelevant that lower prices are good
for consumers, and the Court similarly disregarded evidence that predatory
pricing had little (if any) discernible effect on market shares.103 After the Chicago
School’s apoplectic animadversions reached a fevered pitch,104 the Supreme Court
in 1993 overruled Utah Pie105: In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.,106 “the Supreme Court adopted a stringent recoupment test that
severely limits findings of predatory pricing.” Under Brooke, a plaintiff can
recover only if he can show (i) the defendant objectively priced his goods or
services below their average variable costs,107 and (ii) the defendant had a
“dangerous probability [] of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”108

97. Id. at 430-31.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273-75 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093
(1980).
99. The Court has traditionally promulgated its predatory pricing rules under the RobinsonPatman Act, 49 Stat. 1526. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
509 U.S. 209 (1993). However, the rules apply equally under the Sherman Act. See PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 726d (2004) (“Although dealing only with
predation claims brought under the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court made clear that its analysis
applied equally to Sherman Act claims.” (citing Brooke, 509 U.S. at 221-22)).
100. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). The roots of the
Utah Pie doctrine can be traced at least as far back as the 1940s. See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC,
324 U.S. 726 (1945).
101. Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 697.
102. See id. at 699-700.
103. See id. at 692 & n.7.
104. See, e.g., 3 PHILIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 720c (1978);
BORK, supra note 12, at 386-87; RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
193-94 (1976); Ward S. Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case,
77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967).
105. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 99, ¶ 726d2 (“Brooke
effectively overruled the Supreme Court’s earlier Utah Pie decision, which had based liability on
occasional prices below full cost, weak evidence of animus against the plaintiff, and a declining
price structure. Although the Court purported to adhere to that decision, the facts of that case
would certainly yield summary judgment for a defendant today.” (footnotes omitted)); Rebel Oil
Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1445 n.16 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 987
(1995) (describing Brooke as “implicitly overruling Utah Pie”); Donald J. Boudreaux, Kenneth G.
Elzinga, & David E. Mills, The Supreme Court’s Predation Odyssey: From Fruit Pies to
Cigarettes, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 57, 58 (1995) (“Although the [Brooke] Court did not openly
admit to undoing Utah Pie, undo Utah Pie it did.”).
106. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
107. See id. at 222 & n.1.
108. Brooke, 509 U.S. at 224.
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Chicago Schoolers understandably danced atop Utah Pie’s grave,109 but no one
paused to consider the drawbacks of the Court’s volte face. Amongst the
uncounted costs: The Court’s capricious change of tune taught the lower federal
courts to create novel and unfounded theories of antitrust predation.110
The area of mergers provides yet another illustration of the Court’s
jurisprudential waffling. In 1962, the Supreme Court indicated it would refuse to
sanction a horizontal acquisition of as much as 5% in a market characterized by
minimal or no entry barriers.111 Four years later the Court appeared to have
lowered the threshold market share to no greater than 4.5%.112 That same year the
Court struck down a horizontal merger between two grocery chains in which the
surviving firm had only 1.4% of the grocery stores and 7.5% of the grocery sales
in a relevant market characterized by a significant trend toward concentration and
an increase of acquisitions of small companies by large chains.113 Later, however,
the Court abandoned its almost religious devotion to market-share analysis and
found lawful a horizontal merger that would have been presumptively illegal
under prior cases because the defendant had demonstrated that the acquisition
threatened no substantial lessening of competition.114
Perhaps the Court’s most drastic antitrust flip-flop came in the area of
vertical restraints. In 1967, the Court held that non-price vertical restraints (such
as territorial sales restrictions) were per se unlawful.115 Ten short years later, the
Court changed course and held such restraints must be analyzed under the rule of
reason.116 The most prominent antitrust scholars cheered the Court’s lurching
reversal, stare decisis be damned.117 Recently the Court has expanded its
precedent-busting fondness for the rule of reason in the context of horizontal
restraints, as well.118
Some have suggested that the “evolving nature of antitrust law” is
functionally desirable,119 that it is “exactly what the framers of the antitrust laws
intended,”120 and that it is necessary for the government’s efficient regulation of
109. See, e.g., Tom Campbell & Nirit Sandman, A New Test for Predation: Targeting, 52
UCLA L. REV. 365, 369 n.13 (2004) (delighting in the fact that Utah Pie is “a thoroughly
discredited decision”); Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J.
941, 941 (2002) (describing Brooke as “a great victory for the Chicago School of antitrust”).
110. See, e.g., Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d 1030
(9th Cir. 2005) (creating a cause of action under the Sherman Act for “predatory buying”), cert.
granted sub nom., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. (No. 05-381)
(June 26, 2006).
111. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
112. See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550 (1966).
113. See United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
114. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
115. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
116. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see also Broad. Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
117. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 70, at 5.
118. See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (holding all
tying cases subject to the rule of reason); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006) (holding a
joint-venture agreement subject to the rule of reason).
119. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 22, at 670.
120. Id.; see also Bork, supra note 48, at 7-14 (legislative history of Sherman Act confirms
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the markets.121 All of those things might be true. But even if they are, we should
not ignore the extent to which an unstable judge-made legal regime undermines
the rule of law that our Constitution is supposed to protect.122 Rising from the
chaotic ashes of the Articles of Confederation,123 Article I was designed to instill
some much-needed stability to the legislative process. As Madison noted in The
Federalist, legislative instability tends to “damp[] every useful undertaking,” and
“no great improvement . . . can go forward, which requires the auspices of a
steady system of national policy.”124 Moreover, legislative flip-flops diminish
popular “attachment and reverence” towards the political system.125 Thus, even if
our “living” Sherman Act generates good policy outcomes, functional desirability
does not necessarily make it consistent with the Constitution’s formalities and the
rule of law.
The Court’s flip-flopping in its Sherman Act cases stands in stark contrast
to the strong form of stare decisis that traditionally applies to questions of
statutory interpretation. The starkness—and oddness—of this flip-flopping is
particularly peculiar in light of the fact that “[t]he classic illustration of th[e]
heightened deference [to precedent in statutory interpretation cases] is the line of
Supreme Court cases addressing the question whether the Sherman Act . . .
applies to organized baseball.”126 In 1922, the Supreme Court held that the
antitrust laws do not apply to baseball because it is a purely intrastate affair.127
Over the next thirty years, baseball grew far beyond its erstwhile intrastate
boundaries, and the Court’s understanding of the Commerce Clause expanded by
leaps and bounds.128 Nonetheless, when the Court considered baseball’s antitrust
exemption again in 1953, it reaffirmed its earlier conclusion on the strength of
statutory stare decisis.129 The Court insisted that any change in statutory
precedent—even in the antitrust context—ought to come from Congress, not the
courts.130
By the time the Court confronted the issue again in 1972, baseball’s
antitrust exemption was a downright anomaly.131 By then, the Court had
that Congress intended solely to empower the courts to maximize consumer welfare).
121. See Baxter, supra note 22, at 670-71.
122. Others have recognized that antitrust law is adrift in an unsettled “sea of doubt.” See
Arthur, Sea of Doubt, supra note 67, at 292-93.
123. See GORDON WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 405 (1969) (noting that
laws enacted under the Articles of Confederation were “altered—realtered—made better—made
worse; and kept in such a fluctuating position that people in civil commission scarce kn[e]w what
is law”).
124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 421-22 (J. Madison) (Edward M. Earle ed. 1938).
125. Id. at 422.
126. Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 317, 319 (2005).
127. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922).
128. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding a farmer is subject to
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause when he harvests 12 acres of his own wheat on his
own farm and uses it to feed his own family and livestock).
129. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
130. Id.
131. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (“With its reserve system enjoying
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interpreted the Sherman Act to apply to boxing, football, and basketball.132 Only
baseball remained outside the ambit of federal competition law. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court remained steadfast and reaffirmed baseball’s antitrust exemption.
While constitutional or common law cases can be overturned on the basis of an
intervening change in circumstances,133 the baseball exemption involved a statute.
And to paraphrase Justice Stewart from a different context, a statute is
different.134
This example from our nation’s pastime only further illustrates how
confused American antitrust is. From all outward appearances, the Court long ago
stopped interpreting the Sherman Act as a statute and started treating it as a
license to make substantive common-law rules.135 Yet sometimes—as baseball’s
antitrust exemption illustrates—the Court is all too ready to pay deference to its
“statutory” precedents. The result: a Sherman Act whose scope and meaning are
as dubious as its constitutionality.
E.

Lay of the Land

The Sherman Act we have today is the product of a theoretical battle that
was premised entirely on competing definitions of functional desirability. On one
side, the Warren Court and Harvard School argued that certain non-economic
considerations (such as the need to protect small business as an end in-and-ofitself) should play an important part in antitrust law.136 On the other side, the
Chicago School and its legions of economists argued that consumer welfare and
economic efficiency should be the touchstones of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts.137 Neither side of the debate premised its arguments on formal
considerations—such as the text of the Sherman Act or the structural principles
that give shape to our Constitution and our Republic.138
On one level, this result should be unsurprising: Chicago won its victory
over Harvard at a time when the formal niceties of a statute were mere

exemption from the federal antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and an
anomaly,” which “others might regard [] as ‘unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical’ . . . .”).
132. See Barrett, supra note 126, at 320 & n.12.
133. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (discussing
judge-made changes to a constitutional holding); United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S.
397, 403 (1975) (discussing judge-made changes to a common-law holding).
134. Cf. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976). The solution to this
schizophrenia is as simple as it is superficially radical: The federal courts ought to forswear further
tinkering with the machinery of the “living” Sherman Act. Cf. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141,
1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
135. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051,
1058-60 (1979).
137. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 12, at 17-21.
138. See, e.g., Arthur, Sea of Doubt, supra note 67, at 318-19 (“Current debate focuses on
whether the proper goal of Sherman Act cases is economic efficiency alone or a balance of
efficiency and political values.”); Pitofsky, supra note 136, at 1051 (lamenting that there “has
never been a period comparable to the last decade … when antitrust economists and lawyers have
had such success in persuading the courts to adopt an exclusively economic approach to antitrust
questions”).
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afterthoughts, if they commanded any interpretational force at all.139 In the
broader world of statutory interpretation, however, much has changed since the
late 1970s and early 1980s.140 Today, textualism is ascendant—though by no
means dominant or triumphant141—in both the courtroom and the classroom.142
Ironically enough, textualism finds its intellectual headquarters at Harvard Law
School,143 and some Chicago Schoolers have begun to recognize that federal
judges cannot legitimately fill statutory gaps or rewrite legislative directives.144
139. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992).
140. The world of statutory interpretation began to look very different in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. See, e.g., Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.), cert.
granted and judgment vacated, 499 U.S. 933 (1991). In Friedrich, the issue was whether certain
expert fees were recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Writing amidst a division in the circuits,
Judge Posner opted for an inquiry based on legislative intent and purpose, and concluded: “When
a court can figure out what Congress probably was driving at and how its goal can be achieved, it
is not usurpation . . . for the court to complete (not enlarge) the statute by reading it to bring about
the end that the legislators would have specified had they thought about it more clearly or used a
more perspicuous form of words.” 888 F.2d at 514. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded
“for further consideration in light of West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S.
83 (1991).” In West Virginia University Hospitals, Justice Scalia repudiated Posner’s functionalist
approach as “profoundly mistak[ing] our role.” 499 U.S. at 100. According to Justice Scalia,
federal judges are obliged to enforce unambiguous statutory language, lest they “usurp”
Congress’s lawmaking function. For Scalia, “[t]he record of statutory usage demonstrates
convincingly that attorney’s fees and expert fees are regarded as separate elements of litigation
cost” because, although some statutes, “like § 1988, refer only to ‘attorney’s fees,’ . . . many
others explicitly shift expert witness fees as well as attorney’s fees.” Id. at 88.
141. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 671 (1999); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1509 (1998); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); but
see Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006)
(“Textualism has outlived its utility as an intellectual movement. Although textualism has only
lately earned the respect that it deserves, textualism’s recent successes ironically are leading to its
own demise. Textualists have been so successful discrediting strong purposivism . . . that they no
longer can identify, let alone conquer, any remaining territory between textualism’s adherents and
nonadherents.”).
142. Compare Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and In the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L .REV. 800 (1983) (noting that theories of statutory interpretation changed
very little—if at all—in the first 80 years of the twentieth century), with ESKRIDGE, supra note
141, at 1 (noting that in the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, “theories of statutory
interpretation have blossomed like dandelions in spring”), and Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?,
91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005) (noting that the textualism burst onto the scene in the fourth quarter of
the twentieth century).
143. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003);
John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1648 (2001); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
89-102 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity of the Statute]; John F. Manning, Textualism As a
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997); Adrian Vermeule, Three Strategies of
Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 607 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory
Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149 (2001); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the
Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833,
1841 (1998).
144. Compare, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
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But a funny thing happened on the way from Harvard to Chicago and back
again: The scholars and jurists responsible for shaping and advancing our
understanding of the law left antitrust in the Windy City. Thus, while textualists
and their archenemies—the “intentionalists”145—are currently engaging in a
spirited debate over other areas of statutory interpretation,146 they often remain in
agreement over the Sherman Act.147
This stasis is unacceptable—like a monopoly, a theory that faces no
competition fast grows fat and lazy. As this Part has illustrated, the Sherman Act
says nothing about the federal courts’ common-lawmaking powers, much less
does it justify the jurisprudential roller-coaster ride that has whipsawed antitrust
law over the last hundred years. The conventional wisdom blithely turns a blind
eye to these sources of illegitimacy.
What’s worse, conventional sages have never paused to consider the
constitutional problems that would arise if the Sherman Act really said what the
federal courts say it does. Again, this unthinking acquiescence is unacceptable. In
the next two Parts, I attempt to reinvigorate the debate over the proper scope of
the statute by illustrating that its settled meaning (to the extent it has one148) raises
separation of powers and federalism concerns.
III.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

The previous Part attempted to illustrate that the federal courts have—in
true common-law style—expanded, tweaked, and redesigned the scope and shape
of antitrust law in the years following the passage of the Sherman Act. From the
simple statutory ban on “restraints of trade,” the Court quickly began fashioning
newfangled doctrines, rules, and implied terms, which unmoored the Act from its
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 133-60 (1990) (arguing that a statute’s text—as opposed to its legislative
history—should be the touchstone of a judge’s interpretational enterprise), with Robert H. Bork,
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 47-48 (1966) (arguing that
economics should be the alpha and omega of a judge’s interpretation of the antitrust statutes).
Compare also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984) (arguing
judges should interpret the Sherman Act to “perfect the operation of competitive markets”), with
Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 22, at 539 (arguing judges cannot legitimately
interpret a statute by looking beyond its text). Of course, some Chicago Schoolers remain steadfast
economic functionalists. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Evolution of Economic Thinking about
Legislation and Its Interpretation by Courts, in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION: ESSAYS
IN LEGISPRUDENCE 53-66 (Luc J. Wintgens ed. 2005).
145. See generally Nelson, supra note 142 (describing “intentionalism” and the textualist
critique of it); Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 143, at 2390 (same).
146. Compare United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1314 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Easterbrook, J.) (applying a textualist approach and holding that blotter paper treated with LSD
was a “mixture or substance containing a detectable amount” of LSD under 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A)(v) and (B)(v)), with id. at 1331 (Posner, J.) (rejecting textualism and reaching the
opposite result), aff’d sub nom., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
147. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 1028 (7th Cir.
2002) (unanimous result in an antitrust case before Judges Posner and Easterbrook); JTC
Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 179 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v.
Heffernan, 43 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 1994) (same). See also infra notes 167-168.
148. See, e.g., Kauper, supra note 10, at 1640-44 (lamenting the fact that very little, if
anything, is clear or settled in the Court’s Sherman Act jurisprudence).
Printed 8/17/2006 2:55 PM

22

52880-text.native.1155833446

SHERMAN’S MARCH (IN)TO THE SEA

Oldham

common-law roots. However, even if the Sherman Act means what its modern
“interpreters” say it means, its problems are not over: This Part argues that
Congress’s delegation—and the courts’ enthusiastic acceptance—of commonlawmaking powers raises serious constitutional concerns along two dimensions.149
First, it undermines the “horizontal” separation of powers by blurring the
line between Article I and Article III.150 Second (and relatedly151), it undermines
the “vertical” separation of powers by intemperately displacing state law. Each
argument is explained in turn.
A.

Horizontal Separation of Powers

The first problem with the Sherman Act is its dangerous straddling of the
line between Articles I and III of the Constitution. Although some scholars deny
the legislation-like characteristics of judge-made antitrust law,152 it is difficult to
deny that the meaning of the Sherman Act has changed—and drastically so153—
without ever being amended via Article I. This section argues that Article I—not
Article III—is the constitutionally required repository for antitrust lawmaking
power.
1.
Antitrust in Article III: Where It Is
Our antitrust laws are parsimoniously framed in sweepingly broad terms:
What the Sherman and Clayton Acts lack in length they more than make up for in
sheer scope. This combination of brevity and breadth—which is more often found
in the Bill of Rights154 than the United States Code—led to the coining of the
“constitutional Sherman Act,”155 and the description of that statute as
149. The “delegation interpretation” of the Sherman Act is a cornerstone of modern antitrust.
See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 22, at 663 (“By adopting a common-law approach [in the Sherman
Act], Congress in effect delegated most of its lawmaking power to the judicial branch.”); Einer
Elhague, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2044 (2002)
(“To be sure, sometimes it will be clear that what the legislature means or preferred was to
delegate the matter for ongoing judicial resolution. The antitrust statutes, for example, are
commonly understood to involve such a delegation to the courts.”); 1 PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 63, ¶ 103 (1997) (“[T]he Sherman Act effectively vested the
federal courts with a power to make competition policy analogous to that of common law courts
. . . .”).
150. See GORDON SILVERSTEIN, IMBALANCE OF POWERS: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 22 (1997) (distinguishing “horizontal” and
“vertical” separation of powers), Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity,
Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 179195 (2005) (same).
151. See supra note 31 (emphasizing that the horizontal and vertical separation-of-powers
problems associated with the Sherman Act are not independent of one another).
152. See, e.g., Farber & McDonnell, supra note 28, at 658 (“There is simply no reason to
view the antitrust laws as a grant of legislative power to the courts.”); cf. Arthur, Sea of Doubt,
supra note 67, at 270 (arguing the Fifty-First Congress—which passed the Sherman Act—“did not
authorize the federal judiciary to make the basic policy choices in antitrust”).
153. See supra notes 89-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (barring “unreasonable searches and seizures”).
155. See Appalachian Coal, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933) (describing the
antitrust laws as having a “generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in
constitutional provisions”). See also infra note 172 (discussing scholarly debates over the
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(alternatively) the “Magna Carta of free enterprise”156 or our “charter of economic
liberty.”157 Just as the courts have created substantive and remedial rules for, say,
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures,”158
so too have the courts taken it upon themselves to flesh out the meaning of the
federal antitrust laws by creating a doctrinal corpus that has no root in the text or
structure of the statutes themselves.
For example, Robert Bork argues that Congress left the courts free to
“frame subsidiary rules” to its own specific prohibitions, so long as those rules
were “confined by the policy of advancing consumer welfare.”159 This delegation
“calls for those rules, and only those rules, that can be justified in terms of price
theory.”160 These rules are not immutable. Rather, they “are alterable as economic
analysis progresses.” In fact, the courts “are free to revise not only prior judgemade rules but, it would seem, rules contemplated by Congress.” Consequently,
the Sherman Act, “in terms of ‘law’ . . . tells judges very little,” but imposes on
the judge “the awesome task of continually creating and recreating the Sherman
Act out of his understanding of economics and his conception of the requirements
of the judicial process.”161
More specifically, Bork argues that the “whole task of antitrust can be
summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing
productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in
consumer welfare.”162 Bork employs Chicago school price theory to translate this
proposition into specific rules. He would proscribe horizontal mergers that create
very large market shares and naked cartel restraints,163 but he would permit
“agreements on prices, territories, refusals to deal, and other suppressions of
rivalry that are ancillary . . . to an integration of productive economic activity,”
including all distributional restraints.164
All this from a simple statutory ban on “contract[s], combination[s], . . . or
conspirac[ies] in restraint of trade”! Of course, it is true that Congress chose to
frame the antitrust laws in sweepingly broad terms, and a textualist might argue
that courts may not legitimately restrict the scope of the text that passed through
bicameralism and presentment.165 But it is equally true that the “faithful agent”
theory of statutory interpretation neither requires nor countenances the judicial
creation of new common law simply on the basis of a broad statutory text.166
propriety vel non of the “constitutional Sherman Act”).
156. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
157. N. Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
158. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914); but see Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
159. BORK, supra note 12, at 20.
160. Bork, supra note 144, at 24.
161. Id. at 48.
162. BORK, supra note 12, at 91.
163. Id. at 405-06.
164. Id. at 406.
165. See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP.
CT. REV. 223, 247-51 [hereinafter Manning, Nondelegation as Avoidance].
166. As explained further below, an argument can be made that federal courts lack commonlawmaking powers, even in the presence of an express congressional delegation. See infra Part
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What’s puzzling about the Sherman Act is that its most devoted theorists debate
the economically efficient way to give meaning to its vacuous language,167 while
simultaneously arguing that judges should refuse to fill gaps that Congress leaves
in other statutes.168
2.
Antitrust in Article I: Where It Belongs
The better view is that Congress cannot deputize the federal courts—and
federal judges cannot accept a congressional commission—to make standardless
policy judgments,169 regardless of whether the case pertains to competition law.
As Professors Farber and McDonnell have noted, the Sherman Act is a statute just
like any other, and it should be interpreted accordingly.170 The much-derided
rationale from Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States171 is no more justified
in cases involving would-be competitors than it is in cases involving would-be
pastors.
Equally unjustified is that for all the ink spilled over the propriety vel non
of the “constitutional Sherman Act,”172 no one has paused to ponder the
IV.B. A fortiori, the federal courts should not imply federal common-lawmaking powers, as they
have in the context of the Sherman Act. See supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopolization: Past, Present, Future, 61 ANTITRUST
L.J. 99 (1992); Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust 1889, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 150 (1990); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage in Antitrust Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (1987); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, On
Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 445 (1985); Easterbrook, supra note 144; Frank
H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 154 (1984);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1983);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886 (1981).
168. See Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note 22, at 545-47.
169. Robert Bork criticizes many Warren Court precedents—such as Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)—for “enforcing [the Court’s] own social preferences, not
Congress’s.” BORK, supra note 12, at 65. The irony, of course, is that Congress itself never
embodied its “social preferences” in an antitrust statute. Instead, Congress simply delegated to the
courts the power to choose one “social preference” over another, along with some invariably
vacuous—and easily manipulable—statements in the antitrust statutes’ legislative history.
Compare Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 311-23 (relying on the legislative history of the antitrust acts to
conclude Congress intended for courts to value decentralization and small business over economic
efficiency when reviewing proposed mergers), with BORK, supra note 12, at 61-66 (drawing the
opposite conclusion from the same legislative history).
170. See Farber & McDonnell, supra note 28, at 657-60.
171. 143 U.S. 457 (1892). In the Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885, 23 Stat. 332, Congress
broadly prohibited the importation of “labor or service of any kind.” But the title of the act, its
legislative history, and the circumstances surrounding its enactment suggested that Congress had
done so for the apparent purpose of preventing “the influx of this cheap, unskilled labor.” Holy
Trinity, 143 U.S. at 465. In light of this background purpose, the Court felt justified in clipping
back the Act's broad prohibition to exclude professionals (“brain toilers”) from its sweep. Id. at
464; see also id. at 459 (noting that judicial efforts to conform a broad text to its purpose are “not
the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator”). Textualists have lambasted the
Court’s statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 143, at 10-15.
172. Compare Baxter, supra note 22, at 663, 666 (extolling the virtues of the fact that the
Sherman Act is “broadly phrased—almost constitutional in quality,” which “permits the law to
adapt to new learning without the trauma of refashioning more general rules that afflict statutory
law. The need for a process of incremental change was particularly acute in antitrust at the turn of
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consequences of the obvious fact that the antitrust laws—unlike, say, the Fourth
Amendment—are not enshrined in the Constitution. For example, Bork
recognizes that Congress’s delegation of antitrust lawmaking authority to the
federal courts creates potential separation of powers concerns.173 But Bork allays
those concerns by pointing out that federal courts are responsible for
policymaking in many areas of constitutional law:
In constitutional law the trade-off choice [between
competing values or policies] is given to courts, but in
areas where the legislature is not forbidden to make the
choice, we think of such trade-offs as the very essence of
politics. We then typically reserve the choice for
legislative determination and require the terms of the
treaty—between rival interests, between manufacturers
and consumers, laborers and consumers, farmers and
consumers, or high-income groups and low-income
groups—to be written down, with the resultant of the
value trade-offs specified in tariff statutes, labormanagement relation laws, farm programs, and internal
revenue codes. Value trade-offs in antitrust litigation are
of the same nature.174

Incredibly, neither Bork nor anyone after him pauses to explain why antitrust
policymaking is different from trade, labor, agriculture, or tax policymaking—
why the latter four must be vested in the legislature while the first is the proper
province of the courts. Instead, Bork simply asserts that courts can maintain the
separation of powers and “maintain[] the integrity of the legislative process” by
simply adjudicating antitrust cases with a singular adherence “to the goal of
[maximizing] consumer welfare.”175
This non sequitur begs more questions than it answers. How does a singleminded focus on consumer welfare alleviate an otherwise objectionable
separation-of-powers transgression? And even if a focus on consumer welfare
could turn water into wine, from whence does this talismanic principle come?
Unarguably, it is nowhere to be found in the statutory text or structure. And
unarguably, it would give unendingly expansive meaning to the “canon of
constitutional avoidance”176 to uphold the constitutionality of a statute by
the century, when there was great pressure to control perceived abuses by business but little
understanding of what the government could and ought to do to promote competition and free
enterprise”), with Arthur, Sea of Doubt, supra note 67, at 292 (urging courts to “abandon[] the
current constitutional approach to the Sherman Act”).
173. See BORK, supra note 12, at 79 (“The problem may be stated as one of determining
which types of [policymaking] trade-off decisions belong in legislatures and which in courts.”).
174. Id. at 79-80.
175. Id. at 81.
176. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided.”). See also Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1575-80 (2000) (describing the canon).
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plucking from the policymaking ether a principle (however economically efficient
it may be) that is entirely unrelated to well-accepted canons of statutory
interpretation.177
Not so, one might say. For example, it is well known that the Internal
Revenue Code178—like the constitutional amendment that authorizes it179—
defines “income” circularly, and it has fallen to courts to define that concept
based on considerations of tax policy.180 And it could be argued that this example
suggests there is nothing unusual or illegitimate about standardless judicial
decisionmaking in the context of interpreting a vacuous statutory mandate. How is
the Sherman Act different from the Tax Code?
To ask the question is almost to answer it: It is difficult to imagine two
more different statutes. In sharp contrast to the Sherman Act—which has never
been substantively amended181—Congress constantly tinkers with the Code. In the
107th Congress alone, the legislature enacted 350 pages of tax legislation,182 and
the Tax Code is now four times longer than the Bible.183 Over the last hundred
years, the Code has accumulated hundreds of complicated and intricately crossreferenced sections, and it is these substantive sections—not the vacuous general
definition of “income”—that form the interpretive basis for almost all the federal
courts’ tax decisions. And even if Congress never amended the Code, at least the
tax laws are rooted in a constitutional amendment, which the courts might
interpret (like it interprets all constitutional provisions) in a common-law style.184
The Sherman Act does not enjoy similar congressional attention, nor can it claim
a similar constitutional foundation.
177. The Court has frequently cabined the canon of avoidance by admonishing courts not to
“‘press statutory construction to the point of disingenuous evasion even to avoid a constitutional
question.’” Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60 (1997) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57, n.9 (1996)). See also George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S.
373, 379 (1933) (Cardozo, J.) (“‘A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not
only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.’ But
avoidance of a difficulty will not be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion.” (quoting
United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916))).
178. See 26 U.S.C. § 61 (defining “income” as “all income from whatever source derived”).
179. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (empowering Congress “to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived”).
180. Compare, e.g., Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), with Comm’r v. Glenshaw
Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
181. See infra note 297.
182. See General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in the 107th Congress, Jan. 24,
2003, available at http://bookstore.gpo.gov/actions/GetPublication?stocknumber=052-070-073586 (visited June 19, 2006).
183. See 150 CONG. REC. H3648, H3653 (daily ed. June 2, 2004) (Statement of Rep. Smith)
(“Today the Federal Tax Code has 400 percent more words than the Bible and accompanying the
law are a staggering 2.5 million pages of regulations. As a result, it now takes a person filing a
1040 form a full 13 hours and 27 minutes to do their taxes.”).
184. To be sure, the Sixteenth Amendment vests tax-levying power in Congress—not the
courts. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.”). The broader point, however, is that federal courts’
common-law reasoning is on firmer ground in the interpretation of constitutional—as opposed to
the statutory—provisions.
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Fair enough, one might concede. But Congress often gives the federal
courts wide-ranging discretion to decide specific cases. For example, the
Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”)185 illustrates that there is nothing inherently
problematic with Congress’s decision to charge the judiciary with reviewing
specific facts for “reasonableness,”186 even if the courts’ interpretations of that
statutory mandate are tinged with (if not infected by) arbitrariness.187 While critics
assail the SRA for various reasons,188 no one thinks a sentencing judge’s
discretion arises from an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking power.
Again, however, the analogy does not hold up. First, the Sherman Act—
unlike the SRA—says nothing about “reasonableness.” The inclusion of that term
within the former—unlike the latter—is the byproduct of judicial implication, not
congressional legislation.189 Second, federal courts have inherent power to
determine the “reasonableness” of a sentence without a congressional
delegation.190 While no one would argue that federal courts could create antitrust
law without the Sherman Act, “judges in this country have long exercised
discretion” in sentencing, even without the SRA.191 Third, the SRA imposes
statutory limits on sentencing judges’ discretion. That is, federal judges’
discretion is statutorily cabined in the context of sentencing, while it remains
carte blanche in the context of antitrust. Fourth and finally, even without statutory
limits, courts routinely recognize that the Constitution imposes limits on judges’
sentencing discretion.192 That is, the legal community uniformly recognizes that
the Sixth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and the Due Process Clauses
prevent federal courts from imposing whatever sentences they deem just, fair, or
efficient. Unfortunately, no one seems to recognize that the Constitution also
restricts the courts’ powers to fashion antitrust law willy-nilly.
Other examples might be fathomable, and it might be true that the
Sherman Act is not sui generis.193 But the main point is not the uniqueness of
185. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
186. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262 (2005) (“‘Reasonableness’
standards are not foreign to sentencing law. The [Sentencing Reform Act of 1984] has long
required their use in important sentencing circumstances-both on review of departures and on
review of sentences imposed where there was no applicable Guideline.” (citations omitted)).
188. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413-27 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
189. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
190. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 235-36 (2005) (maj. op. of Stevens, J.); see
also id. at 326-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The courts’ inherent power to determine the
reasonableness vel non of a particular sentence can be inferred from the fact that prior to the
imposition of the Sentencing Guidelines, sentencing judges enjoyed the “traditional judicial
authority to increase sentences to take account of any unusual blameworthiness in the manner
employed in committing a crime.” Id. at 235 (maj. op. of Stevens, J.).
191. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (emphasis in original).
192. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 233-37 (maj. op. of Stevens, J.); Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 244
(1999).
193. See supra note 18 and sources cited therein. However, the Sherman Act’s vacuity is
remarkable, even when compared to other antitrust statutes. For example, section 7 of the Clayton
Antitrust Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18, provides a detailed statutory standard for
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judge-made antitrust law. Rather, the point is that—regardless of the propriety of
other statutes—the Sherman Act invites naked judicial lawmaking, pure and
simple, and no one seems to notice (much less care). For at least the last 300
years, it has been clear that the legislature cannot delegate its legislative power to
anyone or anything. As John Locke put it:
The power of the legislative being derived from the
people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can
be no other, than what the positive grant conveyed,
which being only to make laws, and not to make
legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer
their authority of making laws, and place it in other
hands.194

While the Supreme Court has agreed,195 it has nonetheless held that “the
separation-of-powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in particular, do
not prevent Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches.”196
“In determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another
branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to
common sense and the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination.”197
Thus, so long as Congress “shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated
authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power.”198
Arguably, Bork’s consumer-welfare standard would qualify as an
“intelligible principle.”199 The problem, of course, is that Congress did not “lay

evaluating mergers and acquisitions, and both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission have issued even more detailed “enforcement guidelines” to provide administrative
guidance on the meaning of § 18. See, e.g., Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Apr. 2, 1992; rev. Apr.
8, 1997), available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm (last visited July 27, 2006);
Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Mar. 2006), available at
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm (last visited July 27, 2006). Similarly, the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58, contains detailed
statutory provisions, along with a delegation of lawmaking authority to an “independent”
administrative agency (as opposed to a court), see, e.g., id. § 45. And for all of the hue and cry
over the shortcomings of the Robinson-Patman Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), see, e.g., BORK, supra
note 12, at 394-401, its provisions and provisos are (at the very least) more detailed than those
contained in the the Sherman Act. Compare, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Sherman’s blanket ban on
“restraints of trade”), with id. § 13 (Robinson-Patman’s nuanced ban on certain kinds of “price
discrimination”).
194. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 75 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980)
(emphases in original).
195. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
196. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)
197. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
198. Id. at 409.
199. However, it bears emphasizing that Hampton enunciated the “intelligible principle”
standard in the context of a congressional delegation to the President—not the courts. As
explained further below, the nondelegation doctrine operates very differently in the executive and
judicial contexts. See Part IV, infra.
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[it] down by legislative act.”200 The story of modern antitrust law is the story of
the courts’ efforts to settle on an intelligible principle of their own choosing.201
The fact that the courts have flip-flopped in their efforts to find that principle—
despite the unchanged text of the statute202—highlights the fact that they are
exercising raw lawmaking powers.
To be sure, the courts exercise naked lawmaking powers in certain other
contexts, and sometimes they do so at the behest of a congressional delegation.
For example, Congress can statutorily authorize courts to adopt rules of
procedure,203 or to prescribe by rule the manner in which their officers shall
execute their judgments.204 However, notwithstanding some assumptions to the
contrary,205 the judicial power to make substantive rules of antitrust law is not a
logical corollary of the courts’ power to regulate their internal affairs.
Take the example of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.206 Prior to
200. To be sure, the legislative history of the antitrust laws is replete with evidence of
“intelligible principles.” See, e.g., Bork, supra note 48, at 11 (arguing that evidence from the
legislative history establishes “conclusively that the legislative intent underlying the Sherman Act
was that courts should be guided exclusively by consumer [total] welfare and the economic criteria
which that value premise implies”). The problem is that the principle Bork finds has many
contradictory friends. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 22 (1989) (“Bork’s analysis of the legislative history was strained, heavily governed by
his own ideological agenda. . . . Not a single statement in the legislative history comes close to
stating the conclusions that Bork drew.”); Hovenkamp, supra note 78, at 250 (“Bork’s work has
been called into question by subsequent scholarship showing that in 1890 Congress had no real
concept of efficiency and was really concerned with protecting consumers from unfavorable
wealth transfers.”); Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & Economics, and the Courts, L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1987, 181, 206-12 (discussing and criticizing Bork’s strong consumer welfare
claim); Christopher Grandy, Original Intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act: A Re-Examination of
the Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 359, 359 (1993) (“Congress appeared to
reject consumer welfare. If anything, Congress seemed more concerned with producer, rather than
consumer, welfare.”); Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood
Relation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 143, 155-58 (1997) (detailing the “populist” critique to Bork’s
consumer welfare claim); Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J.
263, 282 n.72 (“Too much has already been expended in demonstrating that Bork’s account is
mistaken.”). See also supra note 169.
201. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, An Introduction to Bork (1966), 2 COMPETITION POL’Y
INT’L 225, 225 (2006) (describing the evolution of modern antitrust law in terms of the judicial
struggle to settle on consumer welfare as the guiding principle of antitrust law, given that “[t]he
open-textured nature of the [Sherman] Act—not unlike a general principle of common law—vests
the judiciary with considerable responsibility . . . to choose among competing values”).
202. See supra notes 94-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
203. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 22 (1941).
204. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-46 (1825).
205. Justice Scalia lumps antitrust together with the power to make procedural rules. See
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he courts could be
given the power to say precisely what constitutes a ‘restraint of trade,’ or to adopt rules of
procedure, or to prescribe by rule the manner in which their officers shall execute their judgments,
because that ‘lawmaking’ was ancillary to their exercise of judicial powers.” (internal citations
omitted)).
206. For a history of the congressional-judicial dialectic over the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, see Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Expressly Repudiating Implied Repeals Analysis: A
New Framework for Resolving Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal Rules, 51
EMORY L.J. 677 (2000).
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1934,207 both American and English courts routinely promulgated rules of civil
procedure without congressional delegation or authorization.208 Given that fact,
some have argued that the courts have inherent authority to fashion their own
procedural rules.209 Moreover, this inherent power seems to flow directly from the
separation of powers ordained by the Constitution: Because Congress could create
the lower federal courts and define their subject matter jurisdiction without also
fashioning procedural rules,210 Article III’s vestment of “[t]he judicial Power”211
implies a default power to run the courts as courts, even without congressional
input. Nonetheless, in the 1970s, Congress attempted to reinvigorate its
rulemaking prerogative,212 thus prompting some scholars to argue that courts do
not have inherent rulemaking authority, absent a prior congressional delegation.213
And the bottom line, according to the leading treatise-writers, is that “there is no
consensus of opinion on this rather fundamental issue.”214
But at least there is a debate over courts’ powers to make their own
procedural rules.215 In antitrust, by contrast, the legal community seems content
simply to sit idly by as courts make law, unforced to justify the practice. That
unquestioning acquiescence is particularly indefensible given the world of
difference between judicial-rulemaking-cum-self-governance (such as the creation

207. See Rules Enabling Act of 1934, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
208. See, e.g., George Grayson Tyler, Origin of the Rule-Making Power and Its Exercise by
Legislatures, 22 A.B.A. J. 772, 772-74 (1936); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3D § 1001 at 2 (2002); id., § 1002 at 10 (“The first Congress, in the first
Judiciary Act of 1789, recognized the power of each court to make all necessary rules for the
conduct of its business . . . .” (footnoted omitted)).
209. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 60103 (1926). Some went even further. See, e.g., John H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for
Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928) (arguing that the
authority to regulate practice and procedure is inherently and exclusively part of the judicial power
and can be exercised even in the face of conflicting legislative enactments).
210. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; id. § 2, cl. 2.
211. Id. § 1.
212. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s
Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (1996).
213. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 905 (1976); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A
Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975).
214. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 208, at 3.
215. Especially in the wake of Congress’s attempts to assert rulemaking primacy in the
1970s, see supra note 212 and accompanying text, scholars devoted unprecedented attention to the
propriety of judicial rulemaking in the procedural context. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Process
of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO.
L.J. 887, 888-89 (1999); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015, 1119-26 (1982); Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling
Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 299-302 (1989); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory
Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991); Linda S.
Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers,
77 MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993); Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional
and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 712-29 (1995); Lauren Robel, Fractured
Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1464-83 (1994); Carl
Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Sunset, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 609-10, 616-18 (1998).
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of procedures for managing the courts’ own day-to-day affairs)216 and judicial
rulemaking in run-of-the-mill cases (such as the creation of a standalone antitrust
regime).
Imagine the staggering implications of the alternative rule. Without a limit
on the courts’ powers to make the substantive rules they interpret, the legislature
could simply illegalize all stock-and-bond transactions and allow the courts to
create the securities laws by making whatever exceptions they deem desirable. Or
the legislature could illegalize all pollution and allow courts to create the
environmental laws by making whatever exceptions fit their fancy. Or the
legislature could illegalize insolvency and allow the courts to create the
bankruptcy code by making whatever exceptions they thought prudent. As
fantastical217 as each of these examples seems, it is altogether unclear why our
Congress cannot do the foregoing while it can illegalize “[e]very contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade,”218 and then allow the courts
to create the antitrust laws by making whatever exceptions the economists esteem
efficient. And it is doubly unclear how or why the courts can function as antitrust
lawmakers without any statutorily designated principle (be it efficiency or any
other) to guide their discretion. As Justice Scalia has emphasized:
It is difficult to imagine a principle more essential to
democratic government than that upon which the
doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is founded:
Except in a few areas constitutionally committed to the
Executive Branch, the basic policy decisions governing
society are to be made by the Legislature. Our Members
216. Some have argued that Congress has delegated—and the courts have accepted—similar
common-lawmaking powers over the creation of evidentiary rules. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh &
Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. L. REV. 585, 590 (2006). It is
noteworthy, however, that unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of
Evidence passed through bicameralism and presentment. See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93595, 88 Stat. 1926. And even though federal courts have used their common-lawmaking powers to
tweak the evidentiary rules at their margins, see, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12-13
(1996), the content of the Federal Rules of Evidence are plainly more statutory than judge-made.
See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 4512 at 414
(1996) (“Because the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted directly by Congress, their validity
vis-à-vis state law and the principles of the Erie doctrine stands on ground even more firm than
that of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Evidence Rules are not subject to the Rules of
Decision Act or (unlike the Rules of Civil Procedure) to the Rules Enabling Act. Their validity is
governed solely by the Constitution, but since all of the Rules of Evidence can be viewed
rationally as rules of procedure (the constitutional standard announced in Hanna v. Plumer), they
all clearly are constitutional.” (footnotes omitted)). Moreover, to the extent they raise
constitutional questions, at least the propriety of the Rules of Evidence—unlike the rules of
antitrust—is hotly debated. See, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence]
Rulemaking,” 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 871-73 (2002).
217. Justice Scalia, for one, has decried the fairytale-like nature of judicial lawmaking that
parades as statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494
U.S. 827, 857 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“A rule of law, designed to give statutes the effect
Congress intended, has thus been transformed to a rule of discretion, giving judges power to
expand or contract the effect of legislative action. We should turn this frog back to a prince as
soon as possible.”).
218. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
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of Congress could not, even if they wished, vote all
power to the [courts] and adjourn sine die.219

Perhaps it would present a closer question if the Sherman Act were
enshrined as the Twenty-Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. If it were, then
an argument could be made that the Constitution—as opposed to Congress—had
delegated antitrust lawmaking power to the courts. Even then, however, it bears
emphasizing that the Sherman Act’s text—unlike, say, the Fourth
Amendment’s—does not empower the courts to make common-law
determinations about the “reasonableness” of anything.220 Of course, for better or
worse,221 our actual Constitution does not include the Sherman Act.
What our Constitution does include are limits on Congress’s ability to
delegate its lawmaking powers. To be sure, the Constitution endows Congress
with some flexibility to choose the means for accomplishing its desired ends.
Most notably, the Necessary and Proper Clause222 empowers Congress to enact
laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its authority to
enact in isolation.223 However, the flexibility afforded by the Necessary and
Proper Clause is far from limitless: Even when Congress’s end is constitutional
and legitimate (e.g., federal regulation of the effects on interstate commerce
caused by anticompetitive conduct), its chosen means must be “appropriate” and
“plainly adapted” to that end.224 Moreover, Congress’s means may not be
otherwise “prohibited” and must be “consistent with the letter and spirit of the
constitution.”225 To the extent the letter and spirit of Article I and Article III mean
anything, Congress must make the substantive laws that the courts interpret.
Doubtlessly some readers will object that that ship sailed long ago: In an
administrative state that condones anything short of a “Goodness and Niceness
Commission,”226 it might seem a little late in the day to insist that legislative
power must be vested in the legislature alone. However, as Part IV will argue, it is
a mistake to assume that the nondelegation doctrine is equally toothless in both
the executive and judicial contexts—important differences require its vigorous
application to prevent judge-made antitrust law, even if it is all-but-belly-up in
administrative law.227 Before exploring those differences, however, the next
section explores an independent basis for the unconstitutionality of the Sherman
219. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220. See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
221. Chicago-Schoolers might decry this reality. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 12, at 72
(celebrating judicial lawmaking in antitrust); see also supra note 87 and sources cited therein
(same).
222. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
223. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421-22 (1819).
224. Id. at 421.
225. Id. These phrases are not merely hortatory: For example, cases such as Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), hold that a law
is not “proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause” “[w]hen [it] violates [a
constitutional] principle of state sovereignty.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 923-24; see also New York, 505
U.S. at 166.
226. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1239-41 (1994).
227. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001).
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Act.
B.

Vertical Separation of Powers

In addition to blurring the line between Article I and Article III, judgemade antitrust law undermines the “vertical” separation of powers that would
otherwise insulate state law from federal encroachment. The Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause empowers judges to preempt state law only when interpreting
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.228 Conspicuously absent
from the Supremacy Clause is any mention of the preeminence (and hence
preemptive power) of federal-judge-made rules of decision.229 Nevertheless,
federal courts routinely preempt a panoply of state consumer-protection
statutes.230 That preemptive practice—at least when it comes to statutory
delegations of common-lawmaking power231—is unconstitutional.
1.
Legislative Roots of Statutory Preemption
Any discussion of preemption must begin with the recognition that the
Constitution’s finely balanced provisions contain an inherent bias against new
lawmaking.232 The Framers understood that Article I’s safeguards would inhibit
228. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
229. One might counterargue that federal common law is just as much a “law” as federal
statutory law for purposes of the Supremacy Clause, which gives preemptive force to “[t]his
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . .” Id.
(emphases added). Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-81 (1938) (holding state
common law is just as much a “law” as state statutory law). However, two arguments suggest that
federal common law does not preempt state law. First, “[t]o the extent that we can distinguish
between the courts’ role as interpreters of law and their role as makers of law, . . . the non obstante
provision of the Supremacy Clause applies only to the former role.” Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86
VA. L. REV. 225, 295 (2000) (footnote omitted). Second, the Constitution uses “Law” to refer to
lawmaking only within the context of Article I. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 747, 748 (1999) (arguing that “a contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution
[should be read and understood] in light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the same
(or a very similar) word or phrase”). To the extent the Constitution uniformly refers to statutes as
the only “Laws of the United States . . . made in Pursuance [of the Constitution],” the Supremacy
Clause can be read not to accord preemptive effect to federal common law. See also Nelson,
supra, at 248-49 (suggesting that the Supremacy Clause uses “Laws” as a synonym for “valid
federal statutes”).
230. See, e.g., Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 222-33 (2d Cir. 2004);
TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198 (4th Cir. 2001); Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v. Sullivan,
16 F.Supp.2d 41 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed sub nom., Sea Shore Corp. v. Sullivan, 158 F.3d 51
(1st Cir. 1998); Hertz Corp. v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 1993).
231. By contrast, where the Constitution delegates common-lawmaking powers to the
federal courts, federal common law may carry preemptive force. For example, in admiralty law—
which the Constitution places within the federal courts’ common-lawmaking powers, see infra
note 364—the Court has held that federal-judge-made maritime law preempts contrary state law.
See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1917). But see Ernest A. Young,
Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273 (1999) [hereinafter Young, Preemption at Sea]
(criticizing Jensen); Ernest A. Young, The Last Brooding Omnipresence: Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins and the Unconstitutionality of Preemptive Federal Maritime Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1349, 1349-51 (1999) (same).
232. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-51 (1983); William T. Mayton, The
Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow’s Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative
Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 957-58. The process of bicameralism,
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the passage of all proposed laws, both good and bad, but believed this price was
worth paying: “The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good
laws, will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad
ones.”233 As Stephen Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes have observed:
The genius of the American Constitution lies in its use of
structural devices to preserve individual liberty. Checks
and balances, separation of powers, and federalism all
combine to create opportunities for ambition to
counteract ambition so that the private interest of every
individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. By
thus fragmenting power and institutionalizing conflict,
the new political science of the eighteenth century
sought to oblige a government by men and over men to
control itself.234

Given Article I’s structural impediments to lawmaking, and given the fact
that the federal government has limited (or “interstitial”) lawmaking powers,235
the states are at least partially responsible for enforcing and/or defining many
areas of substantive law.236 Despite long-running debates over the judicial
enforceability vel non of the Constitution’s federalism “rule,”237 there is little (if
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, not only “assures that the legislative power would be exercised only
after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings,” Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951, but it
also decreases the likelihood that the legislative power will be exercised at all. See MARIAN D.
IRISH & JAMES W. PROTHRO, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 402 (2d ed. 1962).
Moreover, the different representational bases of the two Houses (especially the equal
representation of the states in the Senate) operate to require the support of a “supermajority” of the
public to overcome opposition to new legislation. Mayton, supra, at 956; THE FEDERALIST, supra
note 124, No. 62, at 402 (J. Madison) (equal representation of states in Senate provides “an
additional impediment . . . against improper acts of legislation”); see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 232-48 (1962). Finally, the provision that permits
Congress to overcome the President’s veto only by a two-thirds vote of both Houses further
discourages the passage of measures which inspire significant opposition, especially in view of the
fact that the President is selected by yet a third constituency, the nation as a whole. Mayton, supra,
at 954 & n.21; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 124, No. 73 at 476-78 (A. Hamilton) (usefulness of
presidential veto in blocking unwise legislation).
233. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 124, No. 73, at 478; see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951
(The “Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses
would serve essential constitutional functions” and “protect the whole people from improvident
laws.”); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 245 n.102 (1986).
234. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1155-56 (1992) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
235. See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S.
877, 895-96 (1986) (“This Court has long recognized that federal law has a ‘generally interstitial
character,’ in the sense that Congress generally enacts legislation against the background of
existing state law.” (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 7 (1962))).
236. The spheres of exclusive federal jurisdiction are limited. For example, the federal
government has the exclusive power to coin money, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5, § 10, cl. 1, the
exclusive power to grant letters of marque and reprisal, id. § 8, cl. 11, § 10, cl. 1, and the exclusive
power to enter into treaties, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, § 10, cl. 1.
237. As Professor Charles Black has noted:
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any) debate that the Constitution’s structure provides a finely tuned balance
between federal and state interests. An unduly aggressive use of the Supremacy
Clause238 would upset the Constitution’s equilibrium.239
The Court’s preemption jurisprudence reflects the Constitution’s
balancing act. Preemption comes in two flavors—“express” and “implied.”240 The
former pertains to statutes that explicitly withdraw specified powers from the
states, thus preserving exclusive lawmaking power for the federal government.
When considering the preemption of state law, courts generally apply a
“presumption against preemption,”241 which may morph into a “clear statement
rule” when the states’ traditional powers to legislate for the general health, safety,
and welfare are at stake.242 Nevertheless, “[i]t is well established that within
constitutional limits Congress may pre-empt state authority by so stating in
express terms.”243
In the absence of an express preemption clause, the Court sometimes is
willing to conclude that a federal statute nonetheless impliedly withdraws state

Here is one of the most important questions conceivable,
with respect to the legal basis of federalism. Is there an
implied limitation on the federal powers, to the effect that they
shall not be used to deal with some matters under state
authority? The prevalent modern answer is negative. But the
grave corollary is that federalism has no basis in firm
constitutional law. The federal powers . . . can be used to
coerce any result, however “local,” unless such an implied
limitation exists, and the concept of a legally defined
federalism, judicially umpired, has then no substance.
***
The issue here is not whether our federal system, with
state quasi-sovereignty, has any basis. It has a basis in the
political structure of the national government. . . . The issue,
rather, is whether the federal system has any legal substance,
any core of constitutional right that courts will enforce.
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25, 29 (rev. ed. 1970); see also
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (describing the underlying basis for “the
proper division of authority between the Federal Government and the States” as “perhaps our
oldest question of constitutional law”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional
Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 652-81 (1993) (exploring the originalist foundations for New York).
238. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
239. See, e.g., KENNETH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION 47, 56 (1991) (arguing that
“preemption diminishes the state sphere that federalism teaches us to protect”).
240. See, e.g., Nelson, Preemption, supra note 229, at 226-27.
241. But see Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2117
(2000) (the presumption against preemption as a means for balancing federal and state power is a
“solution[, which] seems to me to graft confusion on error. Properly applying the Supremacy
Clause improves doctrinal coherence and permits the proper protection of uniquely federal
interests.”).
242. Compare Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516, 518 (1992), with Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991).
243. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 203 (1983).
Printed 8/17/2006 2:55 PM

36

52880-text.native.1155833446

SHERMAN’S MARCH (IN)TO THE SEA

Oldham

lawmaking power over a particular field. The Court has indicated that a federal
regulatory scheme may be “so pervasive” as to imply “that Congress left no room
for the States to supplement it.”244 Likewise, the “federal interest” in the field that
a federal statute addresses may be “so dominant” that federal law “will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”245 While the
Court has been loath to imply field preemption,246 so-called “conflict preemption”
is often implied whenever compliance with both the state and federal law is “a
physical impossibility,” or state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”247
The preemptive force of federal law is held at bay by three categories of
instruments. Judicial review is the most visible. In the early 1990s, the Rehnquist
Court began a “federalist revival”248 by reinvigorating the theretofore defunct
Tenth Amendment in New York v. United States.249 New York was soon followed
by a series of remarkable decisions imposing limits on federal power in areas as
divergent as: the reach of the Commerce Clause,250 the means available to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment,251 Congress’s authority to require state executive
officials to enforce federal law,252 and the scope of state sovereign immunity.253
244. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
245. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
246. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 617
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur recent cases have frequently rejected field pre-emption in
the absence of statutory language expressly requiring it.”).
247. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997); see also Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514
U.S. 280, 287 (1995); Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992);
Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991); English, 496 U.S. at 79;
California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1989); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co.,
485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 79 (1987);
California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987); Hillsborough County v.
Automated Med. Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int’l
Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 501 (1984); Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass’n v. Agric. Mktg. &
Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 182 (1983);
Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 204; Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982); Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151,
158 (1978).
248. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?,
111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213 (1998).
249. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
250. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act on the ground that it exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (striking down part of the Violence Against Women Act
on the ground that it exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause). But see
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the Controlled Substances Act as an appropriate
exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause).
251. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act as exceeding congressional authority under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
252. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act on the ground that Congress cannot “commandeer” state executive
officials to carry out a federal mandate).
253. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot compel state
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A related—but “softer”254—category of tools for preserving state law
includes the canons of statutory construction, including the presumption against
preemption and the clear statement rule.255 Compared to cases like Lopez and
Morrison—which caused quite a stir256—“statutory interpretation is a more
incremental, and less rigid, form of judicial decisionmaking than constitutional
interpretation. Hence, canonical construction implements important values with
less disruption to the political and legislative processes.”257 Thus, the presumption
against preemption (like its stronger cousin, the clear statement rule) is not an
inexorable command: Congress remains free to preempt state law, but the
legislature must plainly state its desire to do so. Requiring a clear statement of
congressional intent to invoke the mighty power of the Supremacy Clause has the
effect of ensuring that legislators take seriously the scope of their actions, and
forestalls injudicious preemption by increasing the costs of compromise.258 If fullblown, Marbury-style judicial review is a sledgehammer, the presumption against
preemption is a scalpel: The latter is more delicate and more widely used (albeit
less conspicuously).259
A third—and arguably the most important260—means for preserving state
law are the political safeguards of federalism.261 States’ interests are represented
courts to entertain federal claims against the state); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996) (holding that Congress cannot override state sovereign immunity through the Commerce
Clause); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that Congress cannot override
state sovereign immunity through the ADEA). But see Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)
(holding Congress may override state sovereign immunity through Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act); Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding Congress
may override state sovereign immunity through the Family and Medical Leave Act).
254. See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2000).
255. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991).
256. See, e.g., Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80,
80-81 (2001) (listing Lopez and Morrison amongst those cases in which the Court “dissed”
Congress).
257. Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical
Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 744 (1992).
258. See William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow’s Theorem,
Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J.
948, 957-58 (noting that Congress defrays the costs of legislating by agreeing not to agree—i.e.,
by leaving a statute ambiguous or undefined). The presumption against preemption has the effect
of forcing Congress to agree if it wants to exercise preemptive power.
259. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Presumptions, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 907, 920 (1992) (“Ever since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), courts
have had the power to declare a legislative act unconstitutional. Along with that power has come
the recognition that, in a democratic society, the power should be most infrequently exercised.”).
260. Scholars continue to debate the importance vel non of the political safeguards of
federalism. Compare Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 219 (2000) (Given the strength and importance of the
political safeguards of federalism, “the current Supreme Court’s aggressive encroachment on this
system is as unnecessary as it is misguided.”), with John Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of
Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1357, 1313 (1997) (“The political safeguards argument is an
ahistorical one,” and “the available historical evidence demonstrates that questions of state and
federal power were to receive the fullest—if not the primary—attention of the Supreme Court.”).
261. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
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in Congress—most palpably in the Senate—and the President is elected by state
delegations. Thus, as long as a law must pass through bicameralism and
presentment, there will be numerous “veto gates”262 that advocates for states’
interests will be able to use to thwart otherwise preemptive legislation.263 The
Supreme Court relied on the “political safeguards of federalism” as the basis for
its opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,264 which
renounced judicial responsibility for substantively policing even acts of Congress
that directly regulate state political institutions.265 In Garcia, the Court effectively
jettisoned judicial review as a tool for protecting state sovereignty because “[t]he
[federal] political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not
be promulgated.”266 Garcia’s “‘no substantive review’ position is still the rule
with respect to most questions of federal power vis-à-vis the states.”267
The Supreme Court’s Sherman Act jurisprudence runs roughshod over
both the second and third categories of preemption-prevention tools. As a matter
of statutory interpretation, it goes without saying that the Court’s “interpretation”
of the Sherman Act is completely divorced from its text.268 As a result, the Court
has little (if any) need for standard tools of interpretation, such as the canons of
construction, presumptions against preemption, or clear statement rules. And as
the next section explores in greater depth, it is difficult to imagine a regime more
unmoored from the political safeguards of federalism than one in which unelected
and unaccountable judges make substantive rules that carry the preemptive force
of federal law.
2.
Preemptive Power Unmoored
The Supremacy Clause states that the Constitution itself, treaties, and
federal statutes have preemptive effect.269 By so doing, the Clause also allocates
preemptive powers between the governmental branches: Federal courts have the
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
262. See Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll & Barry Weingast (“McNollgast”), Legislative
Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
3 (1994).
263. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY: FOUR PARTY
POLITICS IN AMERICA 16, 19-23 (1963); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
TRADITION: AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 8-9 (1948); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 43-45 (1985).
264. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
265. See id. at 550-51 & n.11.
266. Id. at 556.
267. Kramer, supra note 260, at 217.
268. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through
Tripartite Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1056 (2003) (noting “the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation—the text and legislative history of the Sherman Act—offer little guidance
on” its meaning); Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of
Precedent, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1120 n.173 (2003) (“Rather than follow the literal text
of the Sherman Act, the courts have instead treated it as a command from Congress to develop a
federal ‘common law’ of antitrust.” (citing HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY
52 (2d ed. 1999))). See also supra note 22.
269. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also supra note 229 and sources cited therein
(suggesting that the Supremacy Clause uses the term “Laws” as a synonym for “statutes”).
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power of preemption when interpreting the Constitution; the President (plus twothirds of the Senate) has the power of preemption in undertaking treaties; and the
President plus a majority of Congress, or two-thirds of Congress acting alone, has
the power of preemption when enacting statutes. Absent from this scheme is any
suggestion that the courts acting alone (e.g., by promulgating common-law
rules270) have preemptive powers. By providing specific prescriptions for
displacing state law, the Constitution contains a strong negative implication that it
does not contain additional allocations of preemptive power sub silentio.271
Thus, “[t]he preemptive power is, fundamentally, a legislative power.”272
When executive officials attempt to expand their preemptive authority—e.g.,
through unilateral Presidential decisionmaking, unconstrained by the separation of
powers that impedes the enactment of statutes—courts are justifiably hesitant to
infer the preemption of state law.273 There are some contexts—such as foreign
affairs—in which Presidential preemption is rooted in the Chief Executive’s
constitutional obligations.274 However, the modern administrative state’s wide
swath sweeps far beyond the specific powers entrusted to the President.275 As a
result, some have feared that expansive administrative agendas have undermined
federalism by loosening the constitutional constraints on federal lawmaking.276
But even if executive preemption is constitutionally permissible, it is a
long leap from there to judge-made preemption: The latter is the antithesis of the
political safeguards of federalism.277 To be sure, in some cases the Constitution’s
270. Of course, even those rules that resemble common lawmaking carry preemptive effect
when they are promulgated pursuant to a constitutional delegation. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). See also supra note 231.
271. If anything, the text of the Clause affirmatively suggests that federal common law does
not carry preemptive effect. The Clause provides that “the Judges in every State shall be bound”
by federal statutes and the federal Constitution, and as Adler and Dorf point out, this provision
applies with equal force to federal and state judges. See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf,
Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1113 n.27 (2003)
(“The Clause’s reference to state judges makes clear that they, along with federal actors, are bound
by federal law. The Clause takes for granted that federal actors, including federal judges, are
bound by” the Constitution and federal statutes.). To the extent federal and state judges are
“bound” by the Constitution and federal statutes, they are not “free” to expand them via commonlawmaking.
272. Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 907
(2004) (emphasis added).
273. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1985)
(suggesting that courts will demand more clarity from agencies than from Congress before
preempting state law).
274. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (striking down
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act as inconsistent with the President’s foreign
affairs powers).
275. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (preempting California’s
Compassionate Use Act as inconsistent with executive regulations under the federal Controlled
Substances Act).
276. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1327 (2001).
277. Scholars have long recognized that Congress has an incentive to dodge as much
political responsibility as possible through delegation of its responsibilities to administrative
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plain text,278 structure,279 or original meaning280 requires judicial preemption. But
in the absence of a constitutional obligation to preempt state law, the federal
courts must leave preemption to the politically accountable branches.281
The courts’ constitutional obligation to exercise judicial review is the only
legitimate justification for court-ordered preemption of state law. Since Marbury
v. Madison,282 it has been clear that “[t]he judicial Power”283 to decide “cases or
controversies”284 requires federal courts to choose the applicable rule of decision
amongst multiple possible sources of law. Where those sources conflict, the
Supremacy Clause285 establishes the preeminence of the Constitution over federal
law and the preeminence of federal law over state law.286 Thus, “[t]he Supremacy
Clause builds into the Constitution’s structure the principle that superior law
supplies criteria of validity for inferior law.”287 As part of “the law-finding
process”288 inherent in “[t]he judicial Power,” the courts must displace an inferior
source of law if they find a superior source controlling.
The “law-finding process” looks very different depending on whether
courts are interpreting constitutional or statutory law. When it comes to the
Constitution—the apogee of the legal hierarchy—the “law” includes not just the
document’s words but also its “tacit postulates,” without which “the Constitution
is denied force and often meaning.”289 Thus, the 534 volumes of the U.S. Reports
are largely devoted to fleshing out what the Framers necessarily left unsaid when
composing our admirably brief national charter:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the
subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of
agencies. See Morris Fiorina, Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority, in
REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 175 (Roger Noll ed., 1985); MORRIS P. FIORINA,
CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (2d ed. 1989); DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH
DELEGATION (1993). Presumably a similar dynamic encourages delegation to judges.
278. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
279. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968) (displacing state law under
dormant foreign affairs doctrine).
280. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571-72
(1997) (displacing state law under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine); but see id. at 610
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing “the morass of our negative Commerce Clause case law” cannot
be squared with the Constitution’s original meaning).
281. Of course, the Sherman Act is not a constitutional provision. See supra notes 169-225
and accompanying text.
282. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
283. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
284. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
285. Id. art VI, cl. 2.
286. Chief Justice Marshall put it thusly: “So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if
both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that
case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution,
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case.
This is of the very essence of judicial duty.” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178. See also John Harrison, The
Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 VA. L. REV. 333, 344-51 (1998).
287. Harrison, supra note 286, at 365.
288. Id.
289. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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all the means by which they may be carried into
execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code,
and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It
would probably never be understood by the public. Its
nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines
should be marked, its important objects designated, and
the minor ingredients which compose those objects be
deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.290

As a result, judge-made doctrines, rules, and standards that are promulgated by
necessity in constitutional cases stand alongside the Constitution itself as a source
of “law,”291 with all of the preemptive power that label conveys. Therein lies the
foundation for the oft-cited claim that the Constitution means what the courts say
it does.292
Statutes and statutory cases are very different. For example, statutes are
easier to pass, they are easier to change, they are longer, and (as evidenced by the
Internal Revenue Code) they are often so prolix that they can “scarcely be
embraced by the human mind.” The upshot of these and other differences between
the Constitution and statutes is that there is no legitimate need for judge-made
statutory law.293 And as a result, a statute generates preemptive effect if and only
if the terms of the statute itself command it.294 Therein lies the foundation for the
oft-cited “presumption against preemption.”
Of course, the line between statutory interpretation and common
lawmaking can be a fuzzy one.295 But antitrust is not a close question. Over the
290. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). This was the preface to
the famous line: “In considering this question, then, we must never forget, that it is a constitution
we are expounding.” Id. (emphasis in original).
291. Cf. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1997) (arguing laws
should be interpreted pursuant to “the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of
the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris”).
292. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
293. See generally Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 143.
294. This is not meant to suggest that statutory preemption is always expressly spelled out in
the text of the statute. As explained above, statutory preemption comes in two flavors—“express”
and “implied.” See supra notes 240-247 and accompanying text. The point is simply that both
kinds of preemption are rooted in the statutes themselves—not judge-made rules.
295. Compare George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs—Have
the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263, 266 (1989) (concluding that “all forms of
judicial lawmaking by federal courts—whether presented as constitutional adjudication, statutory
interpretation or federal common law—are essentially the same and should be placed under the
general rubric of federal common law.”), and Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of
Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 889-90 (1986) (concluding that there is no
meaningful difference “between the creation of federal common law and the ordinary
interpretation of federal enactments”), with Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of
Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (“‘Federal common law,’ as I use the term, means
any federal rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text—
whether or not that rule can be described as the product of ‘interpretation’ in either a conventional
or an unconventional sense.”), and Peter K. Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie
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last century, the Court has pulled sudden switcheroos296 on its rules for
monopolization, mergers, and vertical integration—despite the fact that the
Sherman Act’s text has remained unchanged.297 In the context of doing so, the
Court has used the statute’s static text to justify preemption in some cases298 and
(unpredictably299) not others.300 Whatever it means to “interpret” a statute, surely
we can agree that statutory interpretation ends—and substantive rulemaking
begins—when the court creates numerous, diametrically opposed rules without
ever receiving statutory guidance from Congress.
IV.

NONDELEGATION

Confronted with evidence that antitrust courts routinely exercise unguided
discretion in their formulation of substantive rules under the Sherman Act, one
might reasonably argue: So what?301 Given that administrative agencies have
After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980) (“The difference between
‘common law’ and ‘statutory interpretation’ is a difference in emphasis rather than a difference in
kind.”). See also infra note 368 and accompanying text.
296. Cf. Env’l Integrity Proj. v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing the
“surprise switcheroo” doctrine).
297. Since its passage in 1890, the Sherman Act has been amended six times. Four of those
amendments involved simple changes to the criminal penalties associated with Sherman Act
violations. See; 69 Stat. 282 (1955); Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1708 (1974); Pub. L. No. 101588, 104 Stat. 2880 (1990); Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 668 (2004). Only one amendment
affected the substance of the Sherman Act, and it was not made in response to a judicial
interpretation of the statute. See 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (adding two provisos to § 1). Moreover,
Congress deleted the amendment—restoring the Sherman Act to its unaltered form—in 1975. See
Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975) (deleting both provisos). The Court’s flip-flopping
interpretations of the statute, see supra notes 94-Error! Bookmark not defined. and
accompanying text, cannot be explained on the basis of this relatively minor—and short-lived—
change.
298. See, e.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (preempting creation of
“state action immunity” under state law); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (same); 324
Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341 (1987) (preempting New York liquor pricing law);
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980)
(preempting California scheme for wine pricing); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
792-93 (1975) (preempting Virginia bar association’s rule for minimum-fee schedules);
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (preempting Louisiana resale
price maintenance law); see also TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 208 (4th Cir. 2001)
(preempting state price-and-hold law).
299. Others have recognized that the Court inconsistently invokes the Sherman Act as a
vehicle for preempting state law. See Gregory J. Werden & Thomas A. Balmer, Conflicts Between
State Law and the Sherman Act, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1982).
300. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 270 (1986) (holding city rent control
ordinance not preempted by the Sherman Act); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117,
133-34 (1978) (holding that a Maryland statute regulating price reductions made by petroleum
producers to retail gas stations was not preempted by the Sherman Act or the Robinson-Patman
Act); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (holding the Sherman Act does not preempt the
California Agricultural Prorate Act, which created a cartel-like state administrative framework for
orchestrating price and commodity distribution controls in the California raisin market); Puerto
Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 259- 60, 263 (1937) (holding that the Sherman Act does not
preempt Puerto Rico’s antitrust statute).
301. For example, Professor Manning seems to argue that the only problematic delegations
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virtually carte blanche discretion to make substantive rules with little or no
legislative guidance,302 and given that Congress’s delegation of antitrust powers
to the courts is analytically analogous to its delegations to administrative
agencies,303 one might argue, the courts should enjoy a similarly blank check
when it comes to antitrust rulemaking, right?304 Wrong. As this Part illustrates,
even if the nondelegation doctrine is toothless in the context of administrative
law, it should apply with uncommon bite in the judicial context.
A.

Executive Nondelegation

Notwithstanding some prominent skeptics,305 many scholars recognize that
the nondelegation doctrine has deep historical roots in American legal traditions,
dating back at least as far as John Locke:
The power of the Legislative being derived from the
of lawmaking power are those that take the form of legislative history. See Manning, Textualism
As a Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 143, at 675. Manning argues that floor statements and
committee reports—which do not surmount the constitutional hurdles of bicameralism and
presentment—amount to unconstitutional attempts to delegate congressional lawmaking powers to
individual Members, committees, or staffers. Other delegations of congressional power, however,
are not problematic: “Delegation to agencies or courts—unlike self-delegation to congressional
committees or sponsors—leaves intact an important structural check on Congress’s power. When
Congress delegates lawmaking authority to an agency or court, it cedes some of its own control
over statutory meaning to a distinct branch that, by constitutional design, is independent of
Congress. This feature of the constitutional structure imposes substantial agency costs whenever
Congress delegates a question to a court or an agency, rather than clearly resolving the matter
itself.” Id. at 711.
302. See, e.g., Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of
Precedent, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1117 (2003) (“The Supreme Court has come close to
giving Congress carte blanche to grant as much discretion as it chooses as a matter of policy to the
other departments.” (citing, inter alia, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75
(2001))); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 370-72 (2002)
(describing the moribund state of nondelegation doctrine at the Supreme Court).
303. See Manning, Textualism As a Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 143, at 676; BORK,
supra note 12, at 63 (“Congress recognized that it was delegating broad rule-making power to the
courts,” and the legislative history of the Sherman Act provides ample evidence of congressional
“intent” to guide the courts’ rulemaking powers by the “intelligible principle” of maximizing
“consumer welfare”); cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1731-32 (2002) (arguing courts and scholars should abandon
the nondelegation doctrine because courts have upheld the broad delegations inherent in the
Sherman Act, which is at least as broad as any delegation Congress makes to an administrative
agency).
304. Posner and Vermeule forcefully argue that the nondelegation doctrine “lacks any
foundation in constitutional text and structure, in standard originalist sources, or in sound
economic and political theory.” Posner & Vermeule, supra note 303, at 1722. See also Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331 (2003). For
purposes of this Article, suffice it to say that I—like Professors Lawson, Alexander and Prakash—
have faith in the constitutional heritage and meaningfulness of the nondelegation doctrine. See
Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The Proper Understanding of the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (2005); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of
the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297 (2003);
Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, supra note 302.
305. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 303; Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I,
Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097 (2004).
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People by a positive voluntary Grant and Institution, can
be no other, than what that positive Grant conveyed,
which being only to make Laws, and not to make
Legislators, the Legislative can have no power to
transfer their Authority of making Laws, and place it in
other hands.306

Locke’s premise is most clearly embodied in Article I’s Vesting Clause, which
provides “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”307 The Court has held that one corollary of the text and structure
of the Vesting Clause is that “Congress may not constitutionally delegate its
legislative power to another branch of Government” (lest it be “vested” outside of
the “Congress of the United States”).308 However, after making two cameos
during the Marshall Court,309 the doctrine fell into desuetude until the rise of the
administrative state necessitated its reinvigoration.
The story of post-New Deal America has been aptly entitled “the rise and
rise of the administrative state.”310 The “alphabet soup” of administrative agencies
created in the wake of the Great Depression,311 along with the general
enlargement of the federal government during and after World War II, combined
to effectuate an unprecedented expansion in the scope and complexity of federal
responsibilities. As Congress loaded its legislative plate with new priorities, it (by
necessity) pushed more and more of its important policy judgments outside the
confines of Article I:
With the New Deal, . . . the giveaway of what had been
seen as legislative authority (or something close) became
massive. . . . At least as important as the scope of
modern delegation, however, is to whom the power has
been delegated. If there has been any net beneficiary of
Congress’s abdication of authority, it has been the
President. . . . [A] substantial measure of power that
under the nondelegation doctrine would by definition
have resided in Congress has since fallen to the

306. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
267, § 141 at 363 (Peter Laslett, ed. 1988). See also Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank &
Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It has always been assumed that
legislative powers are nondelegable—or, as John Locke put it, that legislative power consists of
the power ‘to make laws, . . . not to make legislators.’”); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672-73 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting Locke).
307. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
308. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991).
309. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-49 (1825) (upholding delegation to
courts to adopt rules of process); The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 382, 388 (1813) (upholding delegation to President to revive trading privileges with
certain countries upon a finding that they had ceased to interfere with neutral commerce).
310. See Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, supra note 226.
311. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 286 n.4 (1979) (“The term ‘alphabet soup’
gained currency in the early days of the New Deal as a description of the proliferation of new
[government] agencies.”).
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President.312

At the beginning of the New Deal, the Supreme Court allowed Congress
to delegate its legislative powers if it provided the delegatee with an “intelligible
principle” to guide its lawmaking.313 Two provisions of the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933314 flunked the “intelligible principle” test.315 Since 1935,
however, the courts have not struck down a single statute on nondelegation
grounds.316 Recognizing the practical necessity of large delegations of power to
executive agencies,317 modern courts have all but abandoned the nondelegation
doctrine.318 As a result, today’s version of the United States Code is replete with
vacuous statutes that empower agencies to make laws “in the public interest,”319

312. Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1820-21 (1996).
313. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 404-09 (1928).
314. Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195.
315. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935). See also Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S.
238 (1936) (invalidating the labor provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation and Recovery
Act as an unconstitutional delegation to private parties).
316. Posner and Vermeule argue that Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining are the
exceptions that prove the nonexistence of the nondelegation doctrine. See Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 303, at 1722-23 (“The Court’s invocation of the [nondelegation doctrine] to invalidate
two statutes in 1935 was nothing more than a local aberration, no more to be taken as
constitutionally fundamental than, say, the original package doctrine, the doctrine of irrebuttable
presumptions, or any of a myriad other constitutional eccentricities that few now bother
remembering.”). Notwithstanding the sui generis nature of Schechter Poultry and Panama
Refining, the Court does occasionally invoke delegation concerns in the course of statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448
U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that an OSHA statute, if interpreted broadly,
would be a sweeping and unconstitutional delegation of power).
317. See Lawson, supra note 226, at 1241. Professor Jaffe has argued that en gross
delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies are the “dynamo of the modern social
services state.” Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
561, 592 (1947). See also Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 60-61 (1983) (describing modern legislators’
willingness to punt difficult policy choices to administrative agencies in a kind of “regulatory
lottery”; Congressmen often agree on the need to take action but disagree over the means through
which to take it).
318. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1384 (1986) (“[W]hile the delegation
doctrine may be moribund, it has not yet been officially interred by the Court.”), aff’d sub. nom.,
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 n.7
(1989) (“In recent years, our application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited
to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to
statutory delegations that otherwise might be unconstitutional.”); see also Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). The modern nondelegation doctrine operates only
indirectly, much like a Damoclean sword (the sharpness of which can be debated). See Manning,
Nondelegation as Avoidance, supra note 165, at 223 (“The nondelegation doctrine . . . now
operates exclusively through the interpretive canon requiring avoidance of serious constitutional
questions.”); Merrill, supra note 305, at 2103-04 (“The only arguable imprint of the nondelegation
doctrine in recent years has been as a canon of interpretation supporting narrow constructions of
statutes so as to ‘avoid’ the constitutional question of excessive delegation. But even this use of
the doctrine is fading and has recently come under attack as pointless or counterproductive.”).
319. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
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or out of “public convenience, interest, or necessity.”320
B.

Judicial Nondelegation

At first blush, the Sherman Act is no different. Its sparse text offers little
to guide its implementers’ discretion. Congress could hardly afford the time or
resources to legislatively promulgate the rules that its delegatee has promulgated.
And the courts have blessed the entire lawmaking arrangement. Thus, it seems
that if it is permissible for Congress to delegate to administrative agencies, it is
equally permissible for Congress to delegate to courts.321
Upon closer reflection, however, the issue is much more complicated.
Even if courts have abandoned the nondelegation doctrine in the context of
administrative law, a similar abdication is more problematic in the antitrust
context for at least four reasons.
1.
The Differences
First, it turns the rationale underlying the Supreme Court’s American
Trucking decision on its head to jettison the nondelegation doctrine in the judicial
context. The source of legitimacy for administrative lawmaking is rooted in the
fact that agencies—unlike courts—remain (at least somewhat) accountable to the
political branches.322 Congress keeps tabs on agencies by conducting oversight
and appropriations hearings, while the President appoints officers and sets their
regulatory agendas. Courts, by contrast, operate unchecked by similar political
mechanisms. Therefore, the argument runs, the unaccountable courts ought not
use the nondelegation doctrine to supplant the decisions made by agencies
because the latter are more democratically legitimate policymakers than are the
former.
It does not follow, however, that courts are therefore equally commodious
receptacles for Congress’s lawmaking functions. Quite to the contrary, the motive
force behind jettisoning the executive nondelegation doctrine—namely, the
political unaccountability of the federal courts—suggests that an Article III judge
should be the last person to qualify as an antitrust policymaker. Thus, far from
flowing as a natural consequence of the moribund nondelegation doctrine, judicial
lawmaking in the antitrust context is undermined by American Trucking.
Second, even after American Trucking, courts retain numerous tools for
enforcing the nondelegation doctrine (albeit indirectly) in the administrative
context. For example, the scope of an administrative agency’s lawmaking
authority is only as broad its statutory mandate, and courts review de novo an
agency’s assertion of jurisdiction.323 Thus, a “hard” step one under the classic
320. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a).
321. Professor Manning has suggested as much. See Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine,
supra note 143, at 2444-45 n.212 (“Conventional delegations presuppose that agencies and courts
will exercise their independent policymaking discretion within the boundaries set by the
delegation.” (citing, inter alia, the Sherman Act)).
322. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(justifying deference to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute on the fact that courts
are “not part of either political branch of the Government”).
323. See id. at 842-43 (“step one”).
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Chevron paradigm can have the effect of limiting an otherwise broad delegation
from Congress to an administrative agency.324 In addition, the federal courts
retain broader powers of judicial review over agencies’ actions, both under the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Due Process Clause.325 Similar failsafes do
not apply in the context of judge-made antirust law,326 wherein the courts
promulgate the rules, and no other branch of government provides an independent
check or balance on the courts’ powers.327 As a result, courts’ unquestioning
willingness to accept congressional delegations of antitrust lawmaking powers
constitutes an unmitigated abdication of constitutional responsibility.
Some have defended the courts’ antitrust lawmaking efforts as a matter of
practical necessity: If Congress were forced to make tough policy choices
regarding the scope and applicability of our competition laws, it would have time
and energy for little (if anything) else.328 However, such statements must make
the Framers turn somersaults in their graves. As James Madison noted, the entire
point of our Constitution’s first Article is to curb “the facility and excess of
lawmaking[, which] seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most
liable.”329 Of course, impediments to lawmaking may mean fewer laws will be
made. But, as the Framers understood, the “injury which may possibly be done by
defeating a few good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of
preventing a number of bad ones.”330 Circumventing Article I through
delegation—be it to the courts or an administrative agency—is inimical to the
Constitution, regardless of whether doing so makes lawmaking more “efficient”:
[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is
324. See Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural
and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV.
1239, 1244 (2002) (In recent years, “the Court has reinforced . . . its historical control over
interpretation by intensifying its review within the Chevron framework and by narrowing the
scope of Chevron deference.”); see also Manning, Textualism As a Nondelegation Doctrine, supra
note 143, at 713-15. Two cases that are frequently cited as examples of the “hard” step one under
Chevron are FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), and MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
325. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592-93 (1985).
326. One failsafe that does apply in the Sherman Act context is the canon of “prescriptive
comity,” under which the Court construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference
with the sovereign authority of other nations. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,
542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (limiting the territorial scope of American judge-made antitrust law).
327. Of course, Congress could exercise supervisory power over the courts antitrust
lawmaking by amending the Sherman Act to overrule the courts’ decisions. However, Congress
has not done so. See supra note 297. And in the face of congressional silence, the courts have
nonetheless changed their antitrust rules drastically. See Part II.D., supra.
328. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 22, at 665.
329. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 124, No. 62, at 417 (J. Madison). See also 2 THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 447 (J.
Elliot ed. 1836) (statement by James Wilson before the Pennsylvania convention) (arguing Article
I was designed to instill a “circumspection in forming the laws,” so as to avoid an inaccurate and
undigested code of laws”).
330. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 124, No. 73, at 496.
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contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency
are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of
democratic government.331

Third, regardless of whether one subscribes to the “unitary executive”
theory, it is an undeniably long leap from Humphrey’s Executor333 to judicial
lawmaking. As Justice Scalia has noted, Humphrey’s Executor is “the case that
marks the birth of what has come to be known academically as the independent
regulatory agency, and derogatorily as the headless fourth branch of
government.”334 Yet for all the hue and cry over Humphrey’s Executor335 and its
extension to the federal courts in some contexts,336 no one seems to have noticed
the more-important wrongness of our antitrust laws: Mr. Humphrey’s claim for
back pay seems quaint and relatively unimportant when compared to
congressional authorization for the court-ordered regulation of every nook and
cranny in the entire American economy.
Moreover, even if it is true that Congress may insulate a “quasi-executive”
officer from executive control,337 it does not necessarily follow that Congress may
vest its lawmaking powers in a purely judicial officer who is subject to neither
executive nor legislative control. As the Court has explained, the Appointments
Clause338 is “designed to preserve political accountability relative to important
332

331. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
293 (1926) (Holmes J., dissenting) (“The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the
Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The
purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the
distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from
autocracy.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 754 n.78 (2001) (“Although having the judges who make
procedural rules interpret and apply them may promote efficiency, such concentration of power in
the same hands may also lead to tyranny, as the Framers well understood.”).
332. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Steven
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J.
541 (1994); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 234.
333. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
334. Antonin Scalia, Historical Anomalies in Administrative Law, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y
Y.B. 103, 106 (1985); see also Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 609-16 (1984).
335. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 334; Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868,
921 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Humphrey’s Executor helped to create a “headless
Fourth Branch” of government, and expressing the view that “adjusting the remainder of the
Constitution to compensate for Humphrey’s Executor is a fruitless endeavor”); Christopher S.
Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Laurence D. Nee, The Unitary Executive During the Third HalfCentury, 1889-1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 88 (2004) (“All in all, Humphrey’s Executor was
a shocking and poorly reasoned [decision]. . . . The most likely explanation is that Humphrey’s
Executor represents another example of the hostility towards the Roosevelt Administration
exhibited by many Supreme Court decisions of that period.”).
336. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 425 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Today’s decision may aptly be described as the Humphrey’s Executor of the Judicial Branch,
and I think we will live to regret it.”).
337. Professor Manning has argued that Humphrey’s Executor does not stand for such a
broad proposition. See John F. Manning, The Independent Counsel Statute: Reading “Good
Cause” in Light of Article II, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1285, 1302-08 (1999).
338. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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government assignments.”339 Thus, far from condoning judicial (i.e.,
unaccountable) rulemaking, the Clause’s original meaning repudiates it.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, there is no general federal common
340
law.
Ever since 1938,341 the Court has recognized that federal judges’
lawmaking powers are limited to certain “interstitial areas of federal interest.”342
As the Court emphatically held in Erie, the Constitution precludes federal courts
from fashioning common-law rules that preempt state law absent a constitutional
command to do so343:
If only a question of statutory construction were
involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a
doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century.
But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued [under
Swift v. Tyson344] has now been made clear, and compels
us to do so.
***
[N]otwithstanding the great names which may be cited
in favor of the [Swift] doctrine, and notwithstanding the
frequency with which the doctrine has been reiterated,
there stands, as a perpetual protest against its repetition,
the constitution of the United States, which recognizes
and preserves the autonomy and independence of the
states,—independence in their legislative and
independence in their judicial departments.345

Erie’s constitutional holding346 was based (in part) on an earlier dissent
339. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997).
340. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004) (noting the “Court has
thought it was in order to create federal common law rules in interstitial areas of particular federal
interest” (emphasis added)); RICHARD FALLON, DANIEL MELTZER, & DAVID SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM ch. 7 (5th ed. 2003); Henry
Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 40522 (1964).
341. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
342. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726727 (1979)).
343. Of course, in cases of statutory preemption, it is Congress—not the federal courts—that
creates the preemptive rule. See, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002)
(holding petitioner’s common-law tort claims are not preempted by a federal statute because the
“task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause,
which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent” (emphasis added));
Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30 (1996) (holding the preemptive
effect of a federal statute is a question “of congressional intent. Did Congress, in enacting the
Federal Statute, intend to exercise its constitutionally delegated authority to set aside the laws of a
State? If so, the Supremacy Clause requires courts to follow federal, not state, law.” (emphases
added)).
344. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
345. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-79 (footnote omitted; emphases added); see also Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956) (“Congress does not have the constitutional
authority to make the law that is applicable to controversies in diversity of citizenship cases.”).
346. Ever since 1938, debate has raged between commentators and scholars over whether
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authored by (ironically enough) Justice Holmes. In Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,347 the Court held that
federal courts disregard state contract law in a diversity suit. Justice Holmes
dissented, emphasizing the “fallacy” of the Swift doctrine, which “has resulted in
an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts of the United States
which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to
correct.”348 The same Justice who decried the Sherman Act’s unmooring from its
common-law roots349 thus also decried the federal courts’ usurpation of state
courts’ rights to fashion contract law. While Justice Holmes lost the battle over
the Sherman Act’s scope,350 his opinion on the federal courts’ commonlawmaking powers (or the lack thereof) was vindicated in Erie.351
2.
The Upshot
The upshot of the foregoing distinctions between judicial and executive
delegations is eerily simple: The Constitution places meaningful restraints on the
lawmaking powers of the federal courts, even if it places few or none on
administrative agencies. To be sure, Article III courts after Erie retain pockets of
common-lawmaking powers.352 These pockets include “such narrow areas as
those concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and
international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations
with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.”353 But whatever bits of commonlawmaking authority Article III protects,354 surely it does not protect the general
Erie is really a “constitutional holding.” See, e.g., CHARLES A. WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL COURTS § 56 & nn. 15-16 (6th ed. 2002) (collecting sources); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.3 & n.146 (3d ed. 1999) (same). Given the fact that resolving this
dispute is beyond the scope of this Article, and given the Supreme Court’s emphatic insistence
that Swift’s “unconstitutionality” compelled Erie’s outcome, 304 U.S. at 77, this Article proceeds
under the assumption that the Court meant what it said.
347. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
348. Id. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
349. See supra notes 39-53, and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 54-70, and accompanying text.
351. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79-80 (quoting and adopting Holmes’s dissent from Black &
White).
352. See Friendly, supra note 340, at 421-22 (arguing Erie prohibited general federal
common law while preserving specialized federal common law).
353. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (footnotes
omitted); see also United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (rights and
obligations of the United States); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943)
(same); Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (interstate dispute); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (international dispute); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (interstate dispute); Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979) (admiralty); Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S.
16 (1963) (same).
354. It is undeniably difficult to ascertain the precise boundaries of the federal courts’
common lawmaking powers. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal
Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 826 (2005) (“In operation, the doctrine of federal common
law is a ramshackle one. The boundaries of the enclaves in which it may operate are uncertain, its
propriety is disputed, and the distinction between it and statutory and constitutional interpretation
is elusive.”).
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power to make substantive rules of commercial law. The contrary conclusion
would render Erie’s constitutional holding a nullity.
Nor can Erie’s constitutional holding retain vitality under the theory that
federal antitrust is not general federal common law. For example, one might
argue that where Congress has deputized the federal courts with commonlawmaking power over a limited area of law—such as antitrust—the courts’
faithful exercise of that power is not “general” lawmaking.355 Rather, it is
specific.356
Again, however, such a reading of Erie renders its “constitutional” holding
a dead letter. If the constitutional bar on courts’ power to make federal common
law is coextensive with the limits on the legislature’s power to pass statutes, then
Article III did very little (if any) work in Erie. That is, if the only thing limiting
the creation of, say, federal tort law is Congress’s power under Article I to
statutorily task the federal courts with making it, then Erie’s limit on “general”
federal common law is as meaningless as the Commerce Clause.357
Precisely, some scholars say. For example, Louise Weinberg argues that
Erie’s limits pertain to the power of the federal government in general—not the
power of the federal courts in particular:
No one with a basic grasp of the essentials of
empowerment would question that Erie was
constitutionally required. Erie’s holding in chief was
about the fundamental empowerment of the nation, not
of its courts. Erie held, precisely, that the nation lacks
power to make state law. State law is reserved to the
states. The power of the nation is to make federal law
only. . . . Nothing in that holding qualifies national
power to make federal law.358

Thus, Weinberg argues, there is nothing in Erie (or the Constitution) that
precludes federal courts from exercising common-lawmaking powers, so long as
the federal government has “an identified national interest” in formulating a
federal rule.359 The contrary view is simply the byproduct of an unthinking
adherence to “the spurious state law imperative”:

355. Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 303, at 1157.
356. It is undeniably true that the Supreme Court has suggested that federal courts have the
power to promulgate substantive common-law rules, given “express congressional authorization to
devise a body of law directly.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004). However, it is
equally true that the Sherman Act is not an express common-lawmaking delegation, see supra
notes 57-67 and accompanying text, and even if it were, it would not change the axiomatic
proposition that Congress cannot statutorily amend the Constitution, see, e.g., City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Thus, to the extent Erie’s constitutional holding turned on the
meaning of Article III, the Sherman Act could not change it even if it purported to do so (which it
does not).
357. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942).
358. Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. L. REV. 805, 811-12 (1989).
359. Id. at 814; see also id. at 827 (“Courts are not limited to enumerated ‘enclaves’ of
federal lawmaking power.”).
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Writers have a romantic attachment to Professors Hart
and Wechsler’s observation that federal law is
“interstitial,” operating against a broad background of
common-law understandings. A similar nostalgia is
bestowed upon Justice Harlan’s almost equally famous
vision, cribbed from Hart and Wechsler, that state law
governs us in our “primary” relations. Writers under this
spell like to posit a presumption in favor of state law. . . .
But this romantic vision seems out of focus. It is fanciful
today to say that federal law governs “interstitially.”360

However, while it might be true that federal law is no longer “interstitial,”
it does not necessarily follow that federal courts are constitutionally empowered
to make that law. As others have explained, each of the “enclaves” of legitimate
federal common law stem from constitutional prohibitions on state lawmaking361:
In certain cases—namely, those affecting the rights and obligations of the United
States (typically, but not always, when the United States is a party), interstate
controversies, international relations, and admiralty362—federal law provides the
exclusive rule of decision.363 State law cannot apply within these “enclaves”
because the text, structure, or original meaning of the Constitution expressly or
impliedly makes each the province of federal law alone.364 As Tidmarsh and
Murray have explained, “states have such a strong self-interest in [an “enclave”related] controversy . . . that state law cannot be expected to provide a sufficiently
detached, reliable, and neutral rule of decision for a controversy.”365 Thus, in the
absence of federal statutory law to govern the outcome in one of these discrete
“enclaves,” the Constitution requires federal courts to fill the gap with federal
360. Id. at 818 (footnotes omitted).
361. See Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967). See also supra notes 277-281 and accompanying
text.
362. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
363. See Hill, supra note 361, at 1026.
364. Id. at 1031-68. For example, federal common-lawmaking power over admiralty can be
inferred from the fact that the Admiralty Clause, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, grants the federal courts
jurisdiction over all admiralty cases, but Article I does not give Congress the power to make
admiralty law beyond its power to “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,” id. art.
I, § 8, cl. 11. Thus, if there is to be federal admiralty law, the courts have reasoned, it must come
from the courts themselves. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451
U.S. 77, 95-96 (1981) (“We consistently have interpreted the grant of general admiralty
jurisdiction to the federal courts as a proper basis for the development of judge-made rules of
maritime law.”); Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Ref. Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285 (1952)
(“To some extent courts exercising jurisdiction in maritime affairs have felt freer than commonlaw courts in fashioning rules.”); see also Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 231, at 279-88.
Similarly, constitutional preemption in international relations cases can be inferred from the
perceived weakness of the government under the Articles of Confederation in matters of foreign
policy, see THE FEDERALIST, supra note 124, No. 15 (A. Hamilton), the presidential power to
command the armed forces, to negotiate treaties, and to appoint ambassadors, see U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 1-2, and the congressional power to declare war, ratify treaties, and provide advice and
consent on ambassadors, see id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id., art. I, § 8, cl. 11. See also Tidmarsh &
Murray, supra note 216, at 624.
365. Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 364, at 588.
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common law.366
Were it not for more than a century of federal common lawmaking under
the Sherman Act, it might go without saying that antitrust does not fit into one of
the constitutionally designated “enclaves.” Apparently oblivious to that fact, the
federal courts have proceeded apace and created antitrust law without any
theoretical justification for doing so. Indeed, even those who argue that the
“enclave” theory underestimates the federal courts’ common-lawmaking
powers—such as Professors Field and Weinberg—recognize that a need for
national “uniformity” is the principal prerequisite for federal common law.367 And
it seems difficult to argue that there is a greater need for “uniformity” in antitrust
than in myriad other areas (such as telecommunications, securities, or
environmental law) that are nonetheless not governed by federal common law.
Of course, one might argue that every federal statute—even those, like the
Sherman Act, that contain nary a reference to common lawmaking—authorizes
the federal courts to make common law; whether the courts exercise that power is
simply a matter of discretion.368 However, that argument cannot be squared with
the original meaning of “[t]he judicial power,”369 which others have persuasively
shown not to include the prerogative to make common law on the basis of a
statutory delegation.370 The better view is that federal common-lawmaking
366. See Hill, supra note 363, at 1025.
367. See Field, supra note 295, at 953; Weinberg, supra note 358, at 851.
368. This seems to be the angle adopted by Professor Weinberg. See Weinberg, supra note
358, at 807 (“To my mind there is no useful theoretical dividing line that would let us say with
confidence, ‘On this side we have the common law, and on that we have statutory interpretation.’
In all cases along the continuum, courts obviously glean what they can from legislative action or
inaction. It is a waste of time to try to isolate the former as somehow ‘legitimate’ in a way that the
latter is not.” (footnote omitted)).
369. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
370. See John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1653-80 (2001); Manning, Equity of the Statute, supra note 143, at 3652 (discussing blurring of judicial and legislative powers in English common law tradition); id. at
58-70 (discussing differences in United States constitutional structure); id. at 85-102 (tracing early
judicial shift away from English interpretive assumptions). As Justice Scalia has noted, common
lawmaking is fundamentally inconsistent with the role of a federal judge:
We live in an age of legislation, and most new law is statutory
law. . . . This is particularly true in the federal courts, where,
with a qualification so small it does not bear mentioning, there
is no such thing as common law. Every issue of law I resolve
as a federal judge is an interpretation of text—the text of a
regulation, or of a statute, or of the Constitution. . . . The vast
majority of what I do is to interpret the meaning of federal
statutes and of federal agency regulations. Thus, the subject of
statutory interpretation deserves study and attention in its own
right, as the principal business of lawyers and judges. It will
not do to treat the enterprise as simply an inconvenient
modern add-on to the judges’ primary role of common-law
lawmaking. Indeed, attacking the enterprise with the Mr. Fix-it
mentality of the common-law judge is a sure recipe for
incompetence and usurpation.
Scalia, supra note 291, at 13-14.
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powers come only from constitutional delegations: Because the Constitution
created the structure and functions of our three-branch government, and because
nothing in the Constitution’s text, structure, or original meaning suggests that
antitrust is a proper province for federal common law, the Sherman Act (as it is
currently understood) is unconstitutional.
There is a delicious irony in the fact that the Court’s last decision to strike
down a statute under the nondelegation doctrine came in Schechter Poultry.371 In
that case, the Court held the promulgation of codes of unfair competition is
exclusively a legislative function, and it cannot be delegated to an administrative
agency. Funnily enough, it cannot be delegated to courts, either.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that the federal antitrust regime is
unconstitutional. What began as a codification of the common law in 1890 has
mutated into a judge-made monstrosity that Senator Sherman and his fellow
framers could not recognize. Through this common-lawmaking enterprise, the
federal courts have abandoned their obligations of statutory interpretation and
usurped the legislative prerogative to make substantive rules of decision, thus
imperiling the separation of powers and principles of federalism. The Constitution
does not and cannot countenance such a result.
While jettisoning the Sherman Act may superficially seem like a quixotic
quest, further reflection reveals that it is neither unimportant nor radical. First, the
importance: To the extent one cares about the words Congress uses in its statutory
enactments, the federal courts’ interpretations of open-ended statutes (like the
Sherman Act) inhere a dire threat. Some jurists—such as Justice Jackson—have
justified broad federal common-lawmaking powers thusly:
The federal courts have no general common law . . . .
But this is not to say that wherever we have occasion to
decide a federal question which cannot be answered
from federal statutes alone we may not resort to all of the
source materials of the common law or that when we
have fashioned an answer it does not become a part of
the federal non-statutory or common law.372

If Justice Jackson is to be believed, textualists run the risk of winning the
statutory-interpretation battle and losing the war. That is, forcing federal judges to
pay lip-service to the law’s language is a meaningless restraint if those judges
remain free to import whatever extra-textual results they wish under the auspices
of “common lawmaking.”373
371. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
372. D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 469 (1942) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
373. As explained above, textualists reject this impulse in areas other than antitrust. See
supra notes 136-147 and accompanying text. See also Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, supra note
22, at 539 (“To delve into the structure, purpose, and legislative history of the original statute is to
engage in a sort of creation. It is to fill in blanks. And without some warrant—other than the
existence of the blank—for a court to fill it in, the court has no authority to decide in favor of the
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Second, the modesty: Notwithstanding the import of the Sherman Act,
little in the antitrust world would change if and when the federal statute lost its
bite.374 All fifty states have “mini-Sherman Acts,” each of which provides
significant protections for consumers.375 And, of course, even without private
rights of action to enforce the Sherman Act,376 Congress would retain the power
to define the administrative dimensions of antitrust. Moreover, Congress could
statutorily adopt whatever substantive antitrust rules it likes (consistent, of course,
with constitutional limits such as the Commerce Clause377). The one thing
Congress cannot do, however, is to delegate that (common-) lawmaking power to
federal courts—and the courts are not free to accept it. Under the Sherman Act, as
with all federal statutes, the content of the law must come from the law-givers, not
its interpreters.

party invoking the blank-containing statute.”).
374. This Article has argued that the courts should cabin the scope of the Sherman Act on
constitutional basis. However, it also bears emphasizing that the courts could cabin its scope on a
statutory basis without offending the canons of interpretation. The ordinarily strong form of
statutory stare decisis does not apply where—as here, see Part II.D., supra—the precedents create
uncertainty by failing to set forth a workable and predictable legal rule. See Swift & Co. v.
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 115-16 (1965), overruling, Kesler v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153
(1962). But see Lauren Vicki Stark, The Unworkable Unworkability Test, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1665
(2005) (arguing courts should jettison the unworkability factor for overruling prior decisions). And
the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply where—as here, see Part III, supra—the prior
construction is inconsistent with the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.
738, 753 (2005), overruling, United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993); Lawrence C.
Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88
MICH. L. REV. 177, 179 (1989).
375. On states’ antitrust policies, see ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, STATE ANTITRUST
PRACTICE AND STATUTES (3d ed. 2004).
376. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a private right of action to enforce the Sherman
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (providing a private right of action to “[a]ny person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws”).
377. It should be noted, however, that the “limiting” effect of the Commerce Clause is open
to debate. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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